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Abstract
We define the common randomness assisted capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel
(AVWC) when the Eavesdropper is kept ignorant about the common randomness. We prove
a multi-letter capacity formula for this model. We prove that, if enough common randomness
is used, the capacity formula can be given a single-shot form again.
We then consider the opposite extremal case, where no common randomness is available, and
derive the capacity. It is known that the capacity of the system can be discontinuous under
these circumstances. We prove here that it is still stable in the sense that it is continuous
around its positivity points. We further prove that discontinuities can only arise if the legal
link is symmetrizable and characterize the points where it is positive. These results shed new
light on the design principles of communication systems with embedded security features.
At last we investigate the effect of super-activation of the message transmission capacity
of AVWCs under the average error criterion. We give a complete characterization of those
AVWCs that may be super-activated. The effect is thereby also related to the (conjectured)
super-activation of the common randomness assisted capacity of AVWCs with an eavesdrop-
per that gets to know the common randomness.
Super-activation is based on the idea of “wasting” a few bits of non-secret messages in order
to enable provably secret transmission of a large bulk of data, a concept that may prove to
be of further importance in the design of communication systems. In this work we provide
further insight into this phenomenon by providing a class of codes that is capacity-achieving
and does not convey any information to the Eavesdropper.
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1 Introduction
Just like in our previous work [38], we investigate a model on the intersection between the
two areas of secrecy and robust communication in information theory: the arbitrarily varying
wiretap channel (AVWC). The communication scenario is depicted in Figure 1.
In this model, a sender (Alice) would like to send messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob) over
a noisy channel. Involved into the scenario are two other parties: a jammer (James) who can
actively influence the channel and a second but illegitimate receiver (Eve). Alice’s and Bob’s
goal is to achieve reliable and secure communication:
First, Bob should be able to decode Alice’s messages with high probability (with respect to the
average error criterion) no matter what the input of James is.
Second, the mutual information between the messages and Eve’s output should be close to zero.
Again, this has to be the case no matter what the input of James is.
Like in our previous work, we add the option of Alice and Bob having access to perfect copies
of the outcomes of a random experiment G (a source of common randomness). While in our
previous work [38] we considered the case where Eve gets an exact copy of the outcomes received
by Alice and Bob, we now extend our study to the case where Eve remains completely ignorant.
The only party which has no access to G in all the scenarios we study is James. We call the
capacities which we derive from the two scenarios the “correlated random coding mean secrecy
capacity” if Eve has information about G and “secret common randomness assisted secrecy
capacity” if Eve has no information about it. When no common randomness is present at all,
we speak of the “uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity”. For the sake of an extended discussion
of secrecy criteria we also define a “capacity with public side-information” which is the data
transmission benchmark for systems where Eve gets to know a part of the messages.
From now on, we use the label CS for the uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity (when no shared
randomness is available between Alice and Bob) and CmeanS,ran for the correlated random coding
mean secrecy capacity (just as in our previous work [38] we restrict attention to the case where
common randomness is used. To the reader which is not familiar with that work we apologize, as
some of our results rely on that previous work). The secret common randomness assisted secrecy
capacity is labelled Ckey and the capacity with public side information Cpp. As is depcited in
Figure 1, it is of vital importance that Eve cannot communicate to James.
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Figure 1: Secure coding schemes for correlated random coding (left) and secret common ran-
domness assisted coding (right)
We give a unified treatment of the subject which allows us to observe the behaviour of the
system while we change the amount of and the access to the common randomness: for common
randomness set to zero one observes instabilities of the system (in the sense that the capacity is
not a continuous function of the channel parameters anymore) and the effect of super-activation.
Roughly speaking, two channels show super-activation when each of them cannot be used for
a certain task (e.g. reliable communication under average error, maximal error or zero error
criterion or, as in this work, secure communication) alone, but if a joint use is allowed the task
becomes feasible. A more precise formulation is given in equations (5) to (7), while the definition
is part of Definition 11 which is followed by a short discussion of super-activation in the scenario
treated here. If common randomness is used between Alice and Bob but Eve gets to know it
as well, it is known from the results in [38] that already small (a logarithmic number of bits,
counted in block-length) amounts of common randomness resolve the instabilities (in the sense
that the correlated random coding capacity is a continuous function of the channel parameters).
It remains unknown whether super-activation is possible when common randomness is present,
and this question is the content of Conjecture 1.
The full advantage from common randomness can only be gained if Eve is kept ignorant of it.
If common randomness is used at a nonzero rate, this rate adds linearly to the capacity of the
system. All the capacity formulas which can be proven to hold in the various nontrivial scenarios
are given by multi-letter formulae. Only if the common randomness exceeds the maximal amount
of information which can be leaked to Eve do we recover a single-letter description. At that
point, the linear increase in capacity stops: In order to carve out these principal features of secure
data transmission in a both exact and elegant mathematical framework we let the number n of
channel uses go to infinity.
We will now sketch the connections of our work with some of the highlights and landmarks in
the earlier literature. While we do not attempt to work in full rigour in the introduction, we
will nonetheless gradually introduce some mathematical notation.
The probabilistic law which governs the transmission of codewords sent by Alice and jamming
signals sent by James to Eve and Bob is, for n channel uses, given by
wbnpyn|xn, snqvbnpzn|xn, snq “
nź
i“1
wpyi|xi, siqvpzi|xi, siq. (1)
Here, sn “ ps1, . . . , snq are the inputs of James, xn “ px1, . . . , xnq those of Alice and zn “
pz1, . . . , znq the outputs of Eve, while yn “ py1, . . . , ynq are received by Bob. All letters are
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Figure 2: Scaling of secrecy capacity with the rate G of secret common randomness. It holds
X “ CmeanS,ran pW,Tq ´ CmeanS,ran pW,Vq, where T is defined below after equation (1).
assumed to be taken from finite alphabets. The action of the channel is, for each natural number
n and therefore also as a whole, completely described by the pair pW,V q of matrices of conditional
probabilities and this could rightfully be called an interference channel with non-cooperating
senders and receivers. With respect to the historical development we will nonetheless prefer to
use a description via the pair pW,Vq “ ppwp¨|¨, sqqsPS , pvp¨|¨, sqqsPS q and the label “AVWC”.
This model has two important restrictions which are widely known: The case where V does not
convey any information about either one of its inputs is the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC).
We will denote this special channel by T “ pT q, where tpz|x, sq “ 1|Z| for all z, x and s. Before we
give some credit to the historical developments in the area, we would like to emphasize that the
notion introduced in (1) extends to products of arbitrary channels from X1 to Y1 and X2 to Y2, let
them be denoted W1 and W2 with respective transition probability matrices pw1py|xqqxPX ,yPY
and pw2py|xqqyPY ,xPX as follows: The transition probability matrix of W1 bW2 is defined by
wpy1, y2|x1, x2q :“ w1py1|x1q ¨ w2py2|x2q (for all x1 P X1, x2 P X2, y1 P Y1 and y2 P Y2).
The notation then carries over to arbitrarily varying channels, where we set
WbW1 :“ pWs bW 1s1qsPS,s1PS 1 . (2)
The model of an arbitrarily varying channel has been introduced by Blackwell, Breiman and
Thomasian [12] in 1960. They derived a formula for the capacity of an AVC with shared
randomness-assisted codes under the average error criterion, and we will restrict our discussions
to this criterion, although important nontrivial results concerning message transmission under
the maximal error criterion have been obtained e.g. in [32, 1]. In [1] it was shown that an
explicit formula for the (weak) capacity of an AVC under maximal error criterion would imply
a formula for the zero-error capacity of a discrete memoryless channel. The latter problem is
open now for half a century.
In [2], Ahlswede developed an elegant and streamlined method of proof that, together with the
random coding results of [12], enabled him to prove the following: the capacity of an AVC (under
the average error probability criterion) is either zero or equals its random coding capacity. This
dichotomic behaviour is extended in the present work to the case where there is a (nontrivial)
eavesdropper that has access to the shared randomness.
After the discoveries made in [2], an important open question was, when exactly the deterministic
capacity with vanishing average error is equal to zero, and in some sense the corresponding
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question for the AVWC is left open by us as well. In 1985, a first step towards a solution was
made by Ericson [27], who came up with a sufficient condition that was proven to be necessary
by Csiszar and Narayan [22] in 1989.
The condition which was developed by Ericson, called symmetrizability, reads as follows: An
AVC W is called symmetrizable if there is a set pup¨|xqqxPX of probability distributions on S
such that for every x, x1 P X and y P Y we haveÿ
sPS
ups|xqwpy|x1, sq “
ÿ
sPS
ups|x1qwpy|x, sq. (3)
An arbitrarily varying channelW that is symmetrizable cannot be used for reliable transmission
of messages, as any input x can, at least in an average sense, be made to look as if it had
been another input x1. An example for a symmetrizable AVC that cannot be used for reliable
transmission of messages just by using one encoder-decoder pair but still has a positive capacity
for correlated random codes was given in [12] and later used again in [2, Example 1]. This
exemplary AVC also serves as an important ingredient to the super-activation results in [16]
and is, as an important example, also to be found in Remark 7 of this document.
On the technical side, this work makes heavy use of the results that were obtained in the
work [22] by extending one of their central results to the situation where Eve gets some
information via V . Namely, we are able to prove the following: If W is non-symmetrizable,
then CSpW,Vq “ CmeanS,ran pW,Vq for all possible V. We do not attempt to give a necessary and
sufficient condition for CS to be positive, since a geometric characterization in the spirit of the
symmetrizability condition 3 is not even known for the usual wiretap channel. Rather, when
speaking about the wiretap channel one usually refers to the concept of “less noisy” channels
that was developed in [21].
The wiretap channel has been studied widely in the literature. The analysis started with the
celebrated work [40] of Wyner, an important follow-up work was [21], by Csiszar and Ko¨rner.
While Wyner only treated the degraded case, Csiszar and Ko¨rner derived the capacity for the
general discrete memoryless wiretap channel. The wiretap channel in the presence of common
randomness which is kept secret from Eve (in this scenario, one could equally well speak of a
secret key) was studied by Kang and Liu in [30].
In recent years there has been a growing interest in more elaborate models which combine insuf-
ficient channel state information with secrecy requirements. Probably the earliest publications
which came to our attention are the work [34] by Liang, Kramer, Poor and Shamai and the
paper [13] by Bloch and Laneman. Shortly after, the papers [9] and [10] by Bjelakovic´, Boche
and Sommerfeld got published. The work [9] provides a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of
the compound wiretap channel with channel state information at the transmitter that matches
an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of general compound wiretap channels given provided
in [34], establishing a full coding theorem in this case. Important contributions of the work
[10] are a lower bound on what is called the “random code secrecy capacity” there, as well as a
multi-letter expression for the secrecy capacity in the case of a best channel to the eavesdropper.
The approach taken in this publication is closely related to the one taken in [10], but the use of
different proof techniques enables us to provide much stronger results. An interesting parallel
development is the work [29] by He, Khisti and Yener studies a two-transmitter Gaussian
multiple access wiretap channel with multiple antennas at each of the nodes. A characterization
of the secrecy degrees of freedom region under a strong secrecy constraint is derived.
A surprising result that was discovered only recently by Boche and Wyrembelski in [16] is
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that of super-activation of AVWCs. We will explain this example in more detail in Remark
7. This effect was until then only known for information transmission capacities in quantum
information theory, where it was proven by Smith and Yard in [36] that there exist channels
which have the property that each of them alone has zero capacity but the two together have a
positive capacity.
Before the work [16] this was assumed to be an effect which only shows up in quantum systems,
where it was observed e.g. in [36].
The work [16] gave an explicit example of super-activation which we repeat in Remark 7, but
a deeper understanding of the effect was not achieved. Based on our finer analysis, we are
now able to provide the following results: First, we give a much clearer characterization of
super-activation of the uncorrelated1 coding secrecy capacity in Theorem 2. Second, and more
for the sake of a clean discussion of coding and secrecy concepts, we define the capacity Cpp
which explicitly keeps a part of the messages public (such that it may be that Eve is able to
decode them). We do not attempt to give a further characterization of Cpp in this work, but
we show that this capacity does as well show super-activation by use of the code concepts that
were developed in [16]. Details are given in Subsection 2.2, together with the exact definition
of Cpp.
We will now give a broad sketch of our results concerning CS and C
mean
S,ran , before we
start concentrating on Ckey. It was proven in [38] that C
mean
S,ran is a continuous quantity, and
while the statement may seem trivial at first sight, it becomes highly nontrivial when the
following are taken into account:
There is at least no obvious way to deduce this statement directly just from the definition of
the capacity, without first proving a coding result, and the latter route was taken in [38], where
an explicit formula for CmeanS,ran was found:
CmeanS,ran pW,Vq “ lim
nÑ8
1
n
max
pPPpUnq
max
UPCpUn,Xnq
ˆ
min
qPPpSq
Ipp;Wbnq ˝ Uq ´ max
snPSn
Ipp;Vsn ˝ Uq
˙
. (4)
Explicit bounds on |Un| were given as well. While one may argue that this is not an efficient
description since one is forced to compute the limit of a series of convex optimization problems,
it turns out to be an incredibly useful characterization in the following sense: First, it enables
one to prove that CmeanS,ran is a continuous function in the pair pW,Vq and this result was obtained
in [38].
As has already been pointed out in [15], the continuous dependence of the performance of a
communication system on the relevant system parameters is of central importance. To give just
one example, consider recent efforts to build what is called “smart grids”. Such systems do
certainly have high requirements both concerning reliability and stability of the communication
in order to avoid potentially damaging consequences for its users.
While it is very interesting from a mathematical point of view, it certainly comes as an unpleas-
ant surprise then that CS does not grant us the favour of being a continuous function of the
1Note that, due to the presence of an eavesdropper, it makes sense to allow the use of randomized encodings.
Using, in such cases, the term “random code” is much too imprecise due to the potential presence of shared
randomness between sender and receiver. Thus, we prefer to use the term uncorrelated codes. The random choice
of codewords within an uncorrelated code represents lack of knowledge both for Eve and James. Analysing the
case where James gains additional knowledge provides an interesting research opportunity, but care has to be
taken when modelling the information flow from James to Eve.
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channel. On the other hand, this casts a flashlight on the importance of distributed resources in
communication networks - in this case the use of small amounts of common randomness. While
one may now be tempted to think that the transmission of messages over AVWCs without the
use of common randomness is a rather adventurous task, we are also able to prove that such a
perception is wrong: Our analysis shows that CS is continuous around its positivity points (this
has been observed for classical-quantum arbitrarily varying channels in [15] already), and we
are able to give an exact characterization of the discontinuity points as well. An example of a
point of discontinuity has been given in [18].
Moreover, our characterization of discontinuity relies purely on the computation of functions
which are continuous themselves, so that a calculation of such points is at least within reach
also from a computational point of view.
Further, the deep interconnection between continuity and symmetrizability which shows up
in our work enables us to give a characterization of pairs pWi,Viq (i “ 1, 2) for which super-
activation is possible only in terms of CmeanS,ran . In order to be very explicit about super-activation,
let us note the following:
The inequality
CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ě CSpW1,V1q ` CSpW2,V2q (5)
follows trivially from the definition of C. It is common to all notions of capacity which are
known to the authors. In contrast, if the inequality
CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą CSpW1,V1q ` CSpW2,V2q (6)
holds, we speak of super-additivity and only if we can even find AVWCs pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q
such that we have
CSpW1,V1q “ CSpW2,V2q “ 0, but CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą 0 (7)
we speak of super-activation.
While it is clear from explicit examples in that super-activation of CS is possible, it turns out
in our work via Theorem 5 that the effect is connected to the super-activation of CmeanS,ran , if the
latter occurs. We would therefore like to take the opportunity of spurring future research by
stating the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1. There exist pairs pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q of (finite) AVWCs such that
CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q “ CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q “ 0, (8)
but
CmeanS,ran pW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą 0. (9)
An initial definition of objects such asW1bW2 has been given in equation (2) and repeated
again in Subsection 2.2. As a last introductory statement concerning super-additivity, let us
mention the connection of super-activation to information transmission in networks: Consider
two orthogonal channels in a mobile communication network. Not taking into account the
issues on the physical layer, on may end up in a description of these channels via W1,W2 from
Alice to Bob and V1,V2 from Alice to Eve. The surprising result then is that, while it may be
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completely impossible to send information securely over each one of them, there exist coding
schemes which enable Alice to send her information securely if both she and Bob have access
to both W1 and W2!
We will argue later in Subsection 2.2 how this effect works for the capacity Cpp. While this
capacity offers an insightful view on the topic, we nevertheless concentrate on the interplay
between CS, C
mean
S,ran and Ckey in this work.
Let us now switch our attention to further results presented in this work. As mentioned
already, we also extend earlier research to the case where lots of common randomness can be
used (exponentially many random bits, to be precise) during our investigation of Ckey. We
do not dive into the issues arising when sub-exponentially many random bits are available,
although the repeated appearance of the activating effect of common randomness in arbitrarily
varying systems seems to deserve a closer study. Our method of proving the direct part does
again yield nothing more than the statement that any number of random bits which scales
asymptotically as const.`p1` ǫq logpnq (for some ǫ ą 0) is sufficient for evading all issues which
may arise from symmetrizable W.
Our restriction to positive rates G of common randomness allows us to give an elegant formula
for Ckey as follows: For every G ą 0, it holds
CkeypW,V, Gq “ mintCmeanS,ran pW,Vq `G,CmeanS,ran pW,Tqu. (10)
Here, T denotes the AVC consisting only of the memoryless “trash” channel T mapping ev-
ery legal input x and jamming input s onto an arbitrary element of Z with equal probability
(tpz|s, xq “ |Z|´1). While the reader familiar with the topic would certainly have guessed the
validity of a formula of this form it is worth noting that this formula is generally “hard to
compute” in the sense that it requires one to calculate the limit in the formula (4) - as long as
G ă CmeanS,ran pW,Tq´CmeanS,ran pW,Vq. If this condition is not met, then CkeypW,Vq “ CmeanS,ran pW,Tq.
Since the latter is the usual capacity of the AVC W, we conclude the following: If enough com-
mon randomness is available, the capacity of the system can be much more efficiently described
- by a formula which does not require regularization anymore!
Again, a look into the area of quantum information theory shows a striking resemblance: The
capacity formula for the usual memoryless quantum channel has been proven to be given by
regularized quantities in the general cases, both for entanglement transmission and for message
transmission. Without going into too much detail about quantum systems we cite here the work
[23] by Devetak as our main reference underlining this statement, although this work has been
both preceded and followed by important results dealing with the topic.
Apart from specific classes of quantum channels which were shown to have non-regularized ca-
pacity formulae [24] by Devetak and Shor, it has also been proven that the entanglement assisted
capacity for message transmission over quantum channels is given by a one-shot formulae [8] by
Bennet, Shor, Smolin and Thapliyal.
To the best of our knowledge, a quantification of the amount of entanglement assistance which
is necessary in order to turn the capacity formula into a one-shot formula has not been given
yet.
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2 Notation and Definitions
This section contains notation, conventions, as well as operational definitions and technical
definitions
2.1 Notation and Conventions
In the context presented in this work, every finite set will equivalently be called an alphabet.
Such alphabets are denoted by script letters such as A, B, S, X , Y, Z. The cardinality of a set
A is denoted by |A|. Every natural number N P N defines a set rN s :“ t1, . . . , Nu. The set of
all permutations on such rN s is written SN . The function exp : RÑ R` is defined with respect
to base 2: expptq :“ 2t. The logarithm log is defined with respect to the same base. For any
c P R we define |c|` by setting |c|` :“ c if c ą 0 and |c|` :“ 0 otherwise. A function f : AÑ R
is nonnegative (f ě 0) if fpaq ě 0 holds for all a P A. To each finite set A we associate the
corresponding set PpAq :“ tp : A Ñ r0, 1s : p ě 0,řaPA ppaq “ 1u of probability distributions
on A. Each random variable A with values in A is associated to the unique p P PpAq satis-
fying PpA “ aq “ ppaq for all a P A. An important subset of PpAq is the set of its extreme
points. Every such extreme point is a point measure δapa1q :“ δpa, a1q where δp¨, ¨q is the usual
Kronecker-delta. The one-norm distance between two probability distributions p, p1 P PpAq is
}p´ p1}1 “
ř
aPA |ppaq ´ p1paq|.
The expectation of a function f : A Ñ R with respect to a distribution p P PpAq is written
Epf :“
ř
sPA ppaqfpaq or, if p is clear from the context, simply Ef .
For each alphabet A and natural number n P N we can build the corresponding product alphabet
An :“ Aˆ . . .ˆA, where ˆ is the usual Cartesian product and there are exactly n copies of A
involved in the definition of An. The elements of An are denoted an “ pa1, . . . , anq. Each such
element gives rise to the corresponding empirical distribution or type N¯p¨|anq P PpAq defined
via Npa|anq :“ |ti : ai “ au| and N¯p¨|anq :“ 1nNp¨|anq. Given A and n P N, the set of all
empirical distributions arising from an element an P An is Pn0 pAq :“ tN¯p¨|anq : an P Anu. Each
type p P Pn0 pAq defines the typical set Tp :“ tan : N¯p¨|anq “ pp¨qu.
Channels are given by affine maps W : PpAq Ñ PpBq. The set of channels is denoted
CpA,Bq. Every channel is uniquely represented (and can therefore be identified with) its set
twpb|aquaPA,bPB of transition probabilities, which are defined via wpb|aq :“W pδaqpbq. It acts as
W ppq :“
ÿ
aPA
ÿ
bPB
wpb|aqppaqδb, (11)
where both W ppq P PpBq and tδbubPB Ă PpBq (another way of writing the above formula would
be to set W ppqp¨q “ řaPAřbPB wpb|aqppaqδbp¨q or even W ppqpyq “ řaPA wpb|aqppaq). As a
shorthand, we may occasionally also write Wp to denote W ppq, in analogy to linear algebra
(every channel is naturally associated to its representing stochastic matrix pwpa|bqqa,b and can
therefore be extended to a linear map on the appropriate vector spaces).
When operating on product alphabets such as A ˆ B we define p b q P PpA ˆ Bq to be the
distribution defined by pp b qqpa, bq :“ ppaqqpbq. Correspondingly, pbn P PpAnq is defined via
pbnpanq :“ śni“1 ppaiq. The same conventions hold for channels: if V : PpAq Ñ PpBq and
W : PpA1q Ñ PpB1q, then V b W : PpA ˆ A1q Ñ PpB ˆ B1q is defined via its transition
probabilities as pv b wqppb, b1q|pa, a1qq :“ vpb|aqwpb1|a1q and the notation carries over to n-fold
products Wbn of W : PpAq Ñ PpBq as before by setting wbnpbn|anq :“śni“1wpbi|aiq.
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For channelsW P CpAˆB, Cq it will become important to derive a short notation for cases where
one input remains fixed while the other is arbitrary. Such induced channels will be denoted, in
case that this is unambiguously possible, by Wp where
Wppδaq :“W pδa b pq. (12)
At times it will, in order to straighten out notation, also be necessary to write the transition
probabilities as either wppb|aq or even wpb|a, pq.
The Shannon entropy of p P PpAq is Hppq :“ ´řaPA ppAq log ppaq, the relative entropy between
two probability distributions p, q P PpAq is Dpp}qq :“ řaPA ppaq logpppaq{qpaqq, if qpaq “ 0 ñ
ppaq “ 0 for all a P A, and Dpp}qq :“ `8, else.
Every p P PpAq and channel W : PpAq Ñ PpBq define a joint random variable which we
call pA,Bq for the moment and which is defined via PppA,Bq “ pa, bqq “ ppaqwpb|aq (for all
a P A, b P B). This enables us to use an equivalent formulation for the mutual information:
Ipp;W q :“ IpA;Bq. (13)
A more operational definition of this quantity can be achieved by noting that the distribution
of pA,Bq in this scenario arises from defining pp2q P PpA ˆ Aq by pp2qpa, a1q :“ ppaq ¨ δapa1q for
all a, a1 P A - it then holds PppA,Bq “ pa, bqq “ ppId bW qpp2qqpa, bq for all a P A, b P B. The
operational interpretation of this probability distribution is that Alice observes the outcomes a
of some random process. Given any such outcome, she makes one copy of it and sends that copy
over to Bob via the channel W , keeping the original data with herself.
We will go one step further and define mutual information on pairs of sequences an P An,
bn P Bn, this time by defining a random variable pA,Bq with values in A ˆ B via PppA,Bq “
pa, bqq :“ N¯pa, b|an, bnq and then setting
Ipan; bnq :“ IpA;Bq. (14)
In addition, we will need a suitable measure of distance between AVWCs. Our object of choice
is the Hausdorff distance which we define as follows: For two channels W, W˜ P CpA,Bq, set
}W ´ W˜ } :“ max
aPA
}W pδaq ´ W˜ pδaq}. (15)
Now we define for a given W “ pWsqsPS , and W1 “ pW 1s1qs1PS 1
gpW,W1q :“ max
sPS
min
s1PS 1
}Ws ´W 1s1}.
Then we can ultimately define
dppW,Vq, pW1,V1qq :“ maxtgpWbV,W1 bV1q, gpW1 bV1,WbVqu. (16)
This is a metric on the set of finite-state AVWCs with the corresponding alphabets A,B, C.
Another ingredient in the following is the notion of the convex hull of a set of channels, which
can for e.g. AVCs W “ pWsqsPS be defined as
convpWq :“
#
W “
ÿ
sPS
qpsqWs : q P PpSq
+
. (17)
At last, we would like to mention that for any given W P CpA,Bq, a P A and subset B1 Ă B we
use the notation
wpB1|aq :“
ÿ
bPB1
wpb|aq. (18)
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2.2 Models and operational definitions
At first, we give a formal definition of an arbitrarily varying channel. This extends our informal
definition from the introduction, without any change in notation.
Definition 1 (AVWC). Let X , Y, Z, S be finite sets and for each s P S, let Ws P CpX ,Yq
and Vs P CpX ,Zq. Define W :“ pWsqsPS and V :“ pVsqsPS . The corresponding arbitrarily
varying wiretap channel is denoted pW,Vq. Its action is completely specified by the sequence
ptWsn , VsnusnPSnqnPN, where Wsn :“Ws1 b . . .bWsn and Vsn :“ Vs1 b . . .b Vsn.
Remark 1. The AVWC pW,Vq can equivalently be represented by defining W P CpS ˆ X ,Yq
via wpy|x, sq :“ wspy|xq and V P CpS ˆ X ,Zq via vpz|x, sq :“ vspy|xq. We will use both
representations interchangeably.
Whenever necessary, we will (for n P N and q P PpSnq) also use the abbreviations
Wbnq :“
ÿ
snPSn
qpsnqWsn , V bnq :“
ÿ
snPSn
qpsnqVsn , (19)
and the corresponding conditional probabilities are defined in the obvious way for all xn P X n,
yn P Yn, zn P Zn as
wbnq pyn|xnq :“Wbnq pδxnqpynq, vbnq pzn|xnq :“ V bnq pδxnqpznq. (20)
Since a central part of our work is to study AVWCs under joint use, we have to carefully
define what we mean here with “joint use”. Let pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q be two AVWCs. Since
state alphabets are finite in all of our work, we will without loss of generality assume that they
have a joint state set S. We then define
pW1 bW2,V1 bV2q :“ ppW1p¨|¨, sq bW2p¨|¨, s1q, V1p¨|¨, sq b V2p¨|¨, s1qqs,s1PS . (21)
We now come to a more “classic” topic: The definition of codes, rates and capacities. From
the start, we will include the possibility of adding some extra variables like shared randomness
or common randomness between Alice and Bob, but also the possibility for Alice to divide her
message set into two parts: One which is to be kept secret from Eve and one which does not
necessarily have to remain secret.
We introduce three different classes of codes, which are defined in the following and related to
each other as follows: The class of shared randomness assisted codes contains those which use
common randomness and these again contain the uncorrelated codes. Formal definitions are as
follows:
Definition 2 (Shared randomness assisted code). A shared randomness assisted code Kn for
the AVWC pW,Vq consists of: a set rKs of messages, two finite alphabets rΓs, rΓ1s and a set
of stochastic encoders eγ P CprKs,X nq (one for every value γ P rΓs) together with a collection
ppDγ1k qKk“1qΓ
1
γ1“1 of sets satisfying
ŤK
k“1D
γ1
k Ă Yn and Dγ
1
k X Dγ
1
k1 “ H for all k ‰ k1 and for
each γ1. In addition to that, there is a probability distribution µ P PprΓs ˆ rΓ1sq. Every such
code defines the joint random variables Ssn :“ pKn,K1n,  n,  1n,Zsn ,Xn,Ysnq (sn P Sn) which are
distributed according to
PpSsn “ pk, k1, γ, γ1, zn, xn, ynqq “ 1
K
µpγ, γ1qeγpxn|kq1
D
γ1
k1
pynqwsnpyn|xnqvsnpzn|xnq (22)
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The average error of Kn is
errpKnq “ 1´ max
snPSn
K,Γ,Γ1ÿ
k,γ,γ1“1
µpγ, γ1q
K
ÿ
xnPXn
eγpxn|kqwsnpDγ
1
k |xnq. (23)
Definition 3 (Common randomness assisted code). A common randomness assisted code Kn for
the AVWC pW,Vq consists of: a set rKs of messages, a set rΓs of values for the common random-
ness and a set of stochastic encoders eγ P CprKs,X nq (one for each element γ P rΓs), together
with a collection pDγk qK,Γk,γ“1 of subsets Dγk of Yn satisfying Dγk XDγk1 “ H for all γ P rΓs, when-
ever k ‰ k1. Every such code defines the joint random variables Ssn :“ pKn,K1n,  n,Xn,Ysn ,Zsnq
(sn P Sn) which are distributed according to
PpSsn “ pk, k1, γ, xn, yn, znqq “ 1
Γ ¨Ke
γpxn|kq1Dγ
k1
pynqwsnpyn|xnqvsnpzn|xnq (24)
The average error of Kn is
errpKnq “ 1´ max
snPSn
1
K ¨ Γ
K,Γÿ
k,γ“1
ÿ
xnPXn
eγpxn|kqwsnpDγk |xnq. (25)
For technical reasons we also define, for all state sequences sn, the corresponding average success
probability of the code by
dsnpKnq “ 1
K ¨ Γ
K,Γÿ
k,γ“1
ÿ
xnPXn
eγpxn|kqwsnpDγk |xnq. (26)
One particularly interesting feature of AVCs is that it may be impossible to transmit any
whatsoever small number of messages reliably from Alice to Bob without using shared random-
ness - but if one is willing to only spend a polynomial amount of common randomness, the
capacity of the channel jumps to the maximally attainable value, an effect which was discovered
in [2].
If a whole communication network is being utilized it may be possible to use one part of the
network to establish common randomness between the legal parties (one could equally well speak
of a secret key here) which is then used to send messages over another part of the system which
may be symmetrizable. This idea was first established in [16]. In this work, we will give a
more careful analysis of the underlying structure, an undertaking which motivates the following
definition:
Definition 4 (Private/public code). A private/public code Kn for the AVWC pW,Vq consists
of: two sets rKs, rLs of messages, an encoder E P CprKsˆ rLs,X nq, and a collection pDklqK,Lk,l“1
of subsets of Yn satisfying Dkl X Dk1l1 “ H whenever pk, lq ‰ pk1, l1q. Every such code defines
the joint random variables Ssn :“ pK,L,K1,L1,Xn,Ysn ,Zsnq (sn P Sn) which are distributed
according to
PpSsn “ pk, l, k1, l1, xn, yn, znqq “ 1
K ¨ Lepx
n|k, lq1Dk1l1 pynqwsnpyn|xnqvsnpzn|xnq. (27)
The average error of Kn is
errpKnq “ 1´ max
snPSn
K,Lÿ
k,l“1
ÿ
xnPXn
1
K ¨ Lepx
n|k, lqwsnpDk,l|xnq. (28)
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With this definition we can formalize the idea of “wasting” a few bits in order to guarantee
secret communication. We would like to compare this approach to the case of a compound
channel, where a sender that knows the channel parameters can send pilot sequences to the
receiver in order to let him estimate the channel. The pilot sequences do not carry information
from sender to receiver. With such a scheme, a sender with state information can transmit
at strictly higher rates than one without. The higher capacity is reached by “wasting” some
transmissions for the estimation. Since the number of channel uses that have to be used for
estimation grows only sub-exponentially in the number of channel uses, there is no negative
impact on the message transmission rate in asymptotic scenarios.
In the case treated here it turns out that sending a small amount of non-secret messages is the
key to increase the secrecy capacity in specific situations. We would like to extend the formal
background of this idea by allowing for a joint transmission of secret and non-secret messages:
Definition 5 (Private/public coding scheme). A private/public coding scheme operating at rates
pRpri, Rpubq consists of a sequence pKnqnPN of private/public codes such that
lim
nÑ8 errpKnq “ 0, (29)
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
logpKnq “ Rpri, (30)
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
logpLnq “ Rpub, (31)
lim sup
nÑ8
max
snPSn
IpKn;Zsn |Lnq “ 0. (32)
A more restricted class of codes arises when there is only one type of messages, which ought
to be kept secret, and in addition allows the use of common randomness.
Definition 6 (Common randomness assisted coding scheme satisfying mean secrecy criterion).
A common randomness assisted coding scheme satisfying the mean secrecy criterion operating
at rate R consists of a sequence pKnqnPN of common randomness assisted codes such that
lim
nÑ8 errpKnq “ 0, (33)
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
logpKnq “ R, (34)
lim sup
nÑ8
max
snPSn
IpKn;Zsn | nq “ 0. (35)
Note that both Definition 5 and Definition 6 require the mutual information between the
secret messages and the output at Eve’s site to be small on average, either over the public
messages or over the common randomness. One may argue that this is a somewhat weak
criterion. In our earlier paper [38] we compared the capacity arising from the use of coding
schemes under Definition 6 to a capacity derived under more severe requirements on the secrecy
criterion. We were able to demonstrate that the respective capacities coincide. It is not known
to us whether a more strict requirement in Definition 5 would lead to a different capacity.
Definition 7 (Secure uncorrelated coding scheme). A secure uncorrelated coding scheme oper-
ating at rate R consists of a sequence pKnqnPN of common randomness assisted codes with Γn “ 1
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for all n P N such that
lim
nÑ8 errpKnq “ 0, (36)
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
logpKnq “ R, (37)
lim sup
nÑ8
max
snPSn
IpKn;Zsnq “ 0. (38)
Definition 8 (Secure coding scheme with secret common randomness). A secure coding scheme
with secret common randomness K operating at rate R and using an amount GK ą 0 of common
randomness consists of a sequence K :“ pKnqnPN of common randomness assisted codes with
limnÑ8 1n log Γn “ GK such that
lim
nÑ8 errpKnq “ 0, (39)
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
logpJnq “ R, (40)
lim sup
nÑ8
max
snPSn
IpKn;Zsnq “ 0. (41)
Remark 2. The reader may wonder why the common randomness is only being quantified for
secrecy schemes where the common randomness is kept secret. The reason for this becomes clear
when reading [17], where it is proven that any shared randomness needed in order to achieve
the correlated random coding mean secrecy capacity can always be assumed to not be larger than
polynomially many bits of common randomness. These small amounts are not counted in the
definition of the respective capacity. This result from [17] got applied in our earlier paper [38]
as well.
Since we completely restrict our analysis to the case where the system uses common ran-
domness, we can spare a few indices to distinguish the different sources of external randomness:
Definition 9 (Secrecy capacities). Given pW,Vq, we define for every G ą 0 the secret common
randomness assisted secrecy capacity as
CkeypW,V, Gq :“ sup
"
R :
There exists secret common randomness assisted
coding scheme K at rate R with GK “ G
*
. (42)
The uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity and the correlated random coding mean secrecy capacity
are defined just as in [38]:
CSpW,Vq :“ sup
"
R :
There exists a secure uncorrelated
coding scheme operating at rate R
*
(43)
CmeanS,ran pW,Vq :“ sup
$&
%R :
There exists a secure common randomness
assisted coding scheme satisfying the mean
secrecy criterion operating at rate R
,.
- . (44)
We refrain from defining the rate region for private and public messages in this work, and
restrict ourselves to consider only the boundary of that region that arises from letting Rpub be
arbitrarily small. This does for example allow us to transmit any finite number of messages, or
numbers of messages that scale sub-exponentially in the number of channel uses.
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Definition 10 (Private/public secrecy capacity). The private/public secrecy capacity is given
by
CpppW,Vq :“ sup
"
R :
There exists a private{public coding scheme at
rates pRpub, Rpriq such that R “ Rpri
*
. (45)
The above definition explicitly allows for the super-activation strategy of [16] to be used,
and shall be explained using this example first. Before we do so, let us give the formal definition
of super-activation:
Definition 11 (Super-activation). Let pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q be AVWCs. Then pW1,V1q,
pW2,V2q are said to show super-activation if CSpW1,V1q “ CSpW2,V2q “ 0 but CSpW1 b
W2,V1 bV2q ą 0.
Now set W :“ W1 bW2 and V :“ V1 b V2. In order to simplify the discussion, one may
additionally set V2 “W2 “ pIdq, where Id P Cpr2s, r2sq and assume that W1 is symmetrizable
but that CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q “ α ą 0. It follows that CpppW1,V1q “ CpppW2,V2q “ 0, because
of symmetrizability and since decoding of the messages that are sent via pW2,V2q is possible
without any error both for Bob and for Eve. These messages may therefore be treated as
common randomness that is known by Eve. We know that already with the choice Ln “ n2
we have enough common randomness to remove any effect arising from symmetrizability of
W1. Since the code arising from the combination of sending and decoding public messages via
pId, Idq and private messages via pW1,V1q is a coding scheme that fits under Definition 5, we
get CpppW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ě α ą 0.
That such a scheme does work as well when CS is considered instead of Cpp can be understood
as follows:
Let two AVWCs pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q be given. Let W1 be symmetrizable, but such that
CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q “ α ą 0. Since W1 is symmetrizable we have CSpW1,V1q “ 0. If no additional
resources are available, the surplus α in the common-randomness assisted secrecy capacity cannot
be put to use. Let now CSpW2,V2q “ 0 but CSpW2,Tq “ β ą 0 (T denotes the trash channel,
so this just means that it is possible to reliably transmit messages over W2). Then
CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ě α ą 0 (46)
and the reason for this effect is that (as before when we considered Cpp) a small amount of
messages can be sent overW2 and is then used as common randomness, therefore increasing the
rate of messages that can be sent reliably over W1 from zero to α. Of course, the messages sent
over W2 can be read by Eve. That this causes no problems with the security requirements can
be seen by defining a toy-model where only two parallel channels with respective adversarially
controlled channel states are considered. This is done as follows:
Let us define random variables Rs,sˆ “ pM, Mˆ,Z1,s, Zˆ2,sˆq where
PpR “ pm, mˆ, z, zˆqq “ 1
M
1
Mˆ
w1,spz|m, mˆqwˆ2,sˆpzˆ|mˆq (47)
and the channels tW1,susPS and tWˆsˆusˆPSˆ can be controlled by James separately. It is understood
that m are the messages, whereas mˆ are the values of the shared randomness that is distributed
between Alice and Bob by using tWˆ2,sˆusˆPSˆ . We assume that for some small ǫ ě 0 we have
max
sˆPSˆ
IpM; Zˆ2,sˆ|Mˆq ď ǫ. (48)
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Observe that Zˆ2,sˆ depends solely on Mˆ via the channel Wˆ2,sˆ (this is where the fact that the two
arbitrarily varying channels are used in parallel), so that the data processing inequality yields
for every s, sˆ that
IpM;Z1,s, Zˆ2,sˆq ď IpM;Z1,s, Mˆq. (49)
It is a consequence of the independence between M and Mˆ that we can (for every s and sˆ) then
continue this chain of estimates as follows:
IpM;Z1,s, Zˆ2,sˆq ď IpM;Z1,s, Mˆq (50)
“ HpMq `HpZ1,s, Mˆq ´HpM,Z1,s, Mˆq (51)
“ HpM, Mˆq `HpZ1,s, Mˆq ´HpM,Z1,s, Mˆq ´HpMˆq (52)
“ HpM|Mˆq `HpZ1,s, Mˆq ´HpM,Z1,s, Mˆq (53)
“ HpM|Mˆq `HpZ1,s|Mˆq ´HpM,Z1,s|Mˆq (54)
“ IpM;Z1,s|Mˆq (55)
ď ǫ. (56)
Thus it is clear that, in addition,
max
sPS,sˆPSˆ
IpM;Z1,s, Zˆ2,sˆq ď ǫ. (57)
It is also evident that this argument ceases to hold true when the channels that are used for
transmission of M and of Mˆ ar not orthogonal anymore. Our sketch indicates why the protocol
developed in [16] is able to meet the secrecy requirement in Definition 7.
After we indicated why the super-activation protocol works we do now want to switch
the topic and highlight a few connections to related problems and technical difficulties:
It is evident from the existing literature on AVCs [5], arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
channels [14] and on the quantification of shared randomness [7, 28, 31, 41, 39] that the latter is
not an easy task. A brief overview concerning the connections between quantification of shared
randomness and arbitrarily varying channels has been given in [14]. Our focus here is on systems
that use only common randomness in various different ways.
In our previous work [38] we developed a formula for CmeanS,ran . The proof, extending the results
established in [16] and [17], displays clearly that already amounts of common randomness which
scale polynomially in the blocklength n are sufficient for achieving the full random capacity.
Moreover, an exact quantification of the amount of shared randomness is not necessary when
speaking about correlated random coding mean secrecy capacity. Either no shared randomness
is allowed in the sense that Γn “ 1 for all n P N or else one allows arbitrarily large amounts of
it but then only uses the above mentioned polynomial amount.
With the functions G ÞÑ CkeypW,V, Gq the story is a different one, as the following
interesting behaviour occurs: They are well-defined for all G ą 0. However, when G “ 0 they
are not unambiguously defined anymore, as it is clearly possible to take e.g. a sequence pΓnqnPN
such that Γn “ n2 for each n P N. In that case, G “ limnÑ8 1n log Γn “ 0, but the amount of
randomness is sufficient in the sense that for every ǫ ą 0 there exists a sequence pKnqnPN of
codes which use only the common randomness Γn, operate at a rate Rǫ “ CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ´ ǫ and
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are both asymptotically secure and satisfy limnÑ8 errpKnq “ 0. Thus, purely from the mathe-
matical definition of CkeypW,V, Gq, one would be tempted to set CkeypW,V, 0q “ CmeanS,ran pW,Vq.
However, from the operational point of view this is unsatisfying: imagine taking the statement
“no common randomness” literally, and therefore setting Γn “ 1 for all n P N. Let W be a
symmetrizable AVC. In that case there is no chance to reliably transmit any whatsoever small
amount of messages with Γn “ 1 for all n P N [27].
It is thus clear that CmeanS,ran pW,Vq “ limGÑ0CkeypW,V, Gq holds, but that it at least seems to
be a difficulty to give a both operationally meaningful and mathematically satisfying definition
of CkeypW,V, 0q (see e.g. [37] for a possible approach to such type of problem).
A quantity which will be proved to be of importance during our proofs and when quan-
tifying how close an AVC is to being symmetrizable is defined as follows: We let Mfin denote
the set of all finite sets of elements of CpX ,Yq.
Definition 12. The function F : Mfin Ñ R` is defined via setting, for each W1 “
pW 1p¨|¨, sqqsPS PMfin,
F pW1q :“ max
UPCpX ,Sq
min
x‰x1
›››››
ÿ
sPS
ups|xqW 1pδx1 b δsq ´
ÿ
sPS
ups|x1qW 1pδx b δsq
›››››
1
. (58)
This function obviously has the property that for every AWVCW1, the statement F pW1q “ 0
is equivalent to W1 being symmetrizable.
3 Main Results
In this section we list our main results. We start with a coding theorem concerning the secret
common randomness assisted secrecy capacity whose direct part is based on our Lemma 1 that
we state directly afterwards. We continue with a second and even more delicate lemma, which
is an extension of [22, Lemma 3 ] to AVWCs. This lemma (Lemma 2) is important: it provides
a direct (coding) part for Theorem 2, which addresses the influence of the symmetrizability
condition (3) on the capacity CS and thereby relates it to C
mean
S,ran .
Our last result connects to the work [16], which showed a very surprising effect that has so
far not been observed for classical information-carrying systems: super-activation. We give a
precise characterization of the conditions which lead to super-activation in Theorem 5.
Theorem 1 (Coding Theorem for secret common randomness assisted secrecy capacity). Let
pW,Vq be an AVWC. For every n P N, set Un :“ r|X |ns. Define
C˚pW,Vq :“ lim
nÑ8
1
n
max
pPPpUnq
max
UPCpUn,Xnq
ˆ
min
qPPpSq
Ipp;Wbnq ˝ Uq ´ max
snPSn
Ipp;Vsn ˝ Uq
˙
. (59)
It holds (with T “ pT q denoting the AVC consisting only of the memoryless channel that assigns
the uniform output distribution to every input symbol),
CkeypW,V, Gq “ mintC˚pW,Vq `G,C˚pW,Tqu (60)
Of course, C˚pW,Tq is the capacity of the AVC W under average error. This capacity has a
single-letter description. Since the first argument in above minimum is not single letter, there is
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room for speculation whether there is room for improvement in this characterization or, if not,
for which value of G the description in terms of a single-letter quantity is possible and for which
not. Apart from the complicated multi-letter form, an important take-away from the above
formula is that the following is true:
Corollary 1. For every G ą 0, the function pW,Vq ÞÑ CkeypW,V, Gq is continuous.
Remark 3. If G “ 0 in the sense that Γn “ 0 for all n P N, then for all AVWCs pW,Vq we
know that CkeypW,V, Gq equals CSpW,Vq.
We are getting closer to the technical core of our work now. The next Lemma is essential to
proving the direct part of Theorem 1. It quantifies how many messages L and how many different
values Γ for the common randomness are needed in order to make the output distributions at
Eve’s site independent from the chosen message k.
Lemma 1. For every τ ą 0 there exists a value νpτq ą 0 and an N0pτq such that for all
n ě N0pτq and natural numbers K,L,Γ and type p P Pn0 pX q there exist codewords pxklγqK,L,Γk,l,γ“1
in Tp Ă X n and decoding sets Dγkl Ă Yn obeying Dγkl XDγk1l1 “ H if pk, lq ‰ pk1, l1q, such that we
have:
If 1
n
logpK ¨ Lq ď minqPPpSq Ipp;Wqq ´ νpτq and Γ ě 2n¨5¨νpτq then
min
sn
Γÿ
γ“1
1
Γ
K,Lÿ
k,l“1
1
K ¨ LwsnpD
γ
kl|xklγq ě 1´ 2´n¨νpτq. (61)
If 1
n
logpL ¨ Γq ě maxq Ipp;Vqq ` τ then
max
sn,k
››››››
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
vsnp¨|xklγq ´ Evsnp¨|Xnq
››››››
1
ď2´n¨νpτq, (62)
where Xn is distributed according to PpXn “ xnq :“ 1|Tp|1Tppxnq and the dependence of ν on τ
is such that limτÑ0 νpτq “ 0.
While Lemma 1 delivers the correct interplay between and scaling of the size of the numbers
of secret messages K, the number of additional messages L that are just being sent in order to
obfuscate Eve and the number of values for the (secret) common randomness Γ that are being
used up in the process, it is insufficient for dealing with the case when Γ is set to one or is kept
very small. For those cases where the secret or partially secret common randomness Γ is set to
one for every number of channel uses, we have to deal with the symmetrizability properties of
the legal link W from Alice to Bob. Initial statements in that case are as follows:
Theorem 2 (Symmetrizability properties of CS). Let pW,Vq be an AVWC.
1. If W is symmetrizable, then CSpW,Vq “ 0.
2. If W is non-symmetrizable, then CSpW,Vq “ CmeanS,ran pW,Vq.
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We now start to take on a slightly different point of view, under which the AVWC becomes an
object that has some parameters which can be subject to changes. When considering practical
deployment aspects, such a point of view is necessary as all information we may have gathered
about the channel during for example a training phase may not be accurate enough to model the
real-world behaviour. Thus one needs to understand whether a slight error in the parameters
may lead to catastrophic events, and this is the content of our next theorem.
Theorem 3 (Stability of CS). Let pW,Vq be an AVWC. If pW,Vq satisfies CSpW,Vq ą 0
then there is an ǫ ą 0 such that for all pW1,V1q satisfying dppW,Vq, pW1,V1qq ď ǫ we have
CSpW1,V1q ą 0.
However, despite the reassuring statement of Theorem 3, care has to be taken at some points,
which are characterized below.
Theorem 4 (Discontinuity properties of CS). Let pW,Vq be an AVWC.
1. The function CS is discontinuous at the point pW,Vq if and only if the following hold:
First, CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ą 0 and second F pWq “ 0 but for all ǫ ą 0 there is Wǫ such that
dpW,Wǫq ă ǫ and F pWǫq ą 0.
2. If CS is discontinuous in the point pW,Vq then it is discontinuous for all Vˆ for which
CmeanS,ran pW, Vˆq ą 0.
Note that F pWq “ 0 is equivalent to W being symmetrizable - a property which is defined in the
introduction in equation (3). The function F itself is the content of Definition 12.
The take-away from above Theorem is two-fold: First, it delivers a criterion for the finding
of a point of discontinuity that only requires the validation that CmeanS,ran (a continuous function)
is nonzero in a specific point and the running of a convex optimization problem (calculation of
F in that point). Second, it becomes clear that any discontinuity of the capacity CS arises solely
from effects that stem from the “legal” link W - changing V has no effect on discontinuity.
Corollary 2. For every W, the function V ÞÑ CSpW,Vq is continuous.
Note that discontinuity is caused both by the legal link W (see statement 1) and the link V
to Eve (statement 2), but depends on V only insofar as the capacity CmeanS,ran pW, Vˆq has to stay
above zero in order for a discontinuity to occur.
Theorem 4 also delivers an efficient way for calculating whether CS is discontinuous in a specific
point or not: One only needs to give a good-enough approximation of the continuous function
CmeanS,ran and then run a convex optimization in order to calculate F pWq. Regarding future re-
search, it may therefore be of interest to quantify the degree of continuity of the capacity of
arbitrarily varying channels in those regions where it is continuous.
Remark 4. It is necessary to request the existence of the Wǫ in the first statement of Theorem
4, and an easy example why this is so is the following:
Define Wi,ǫ P Cpt1, 2u, t1, 2, 3uq for i “ 1, 2 and ǫ P r0, 1{2s by
W1,ǫ :“
¨
˝ 0 1´ ǫǫ 0
1´ ǫ ǫ
˛
‚, W2,ǫ :“
¨
˝ 1´ ǫ 0ǫ 1´ ǫ
0 ǫ
˛
‚. (63)
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For every ǫ P r0, 1{2s, these AVCs are symmetrizable with up1|1q “ ǫ{p1 ´ ǫq and up1|2q “
p1 ´ 2 ¨ ǫq{p1 ´ ǫq. The reason for this is that for every ǫ P r0, 1{2s the convex sets
convptW1,ǫpδ1q,W2,ǫpδ1quq and convptW1,ǫpδ2q,W2,ǫpδ2quq have non-empty intersections. It is
also geometrically clear that for any ǫ P p0, 1{2q, there will be a small vicinity of AVCs which
share this property. Thus, around such a Wǫ, all other AVCs are symmetrizable as well and for
every V we therefore have both CSpWǫ,Vq “ 0 and CSpW1,Vq “ 0 whenever dpWǫ,W1q is small
enough.
It is additionally clear from [12] that CmeanS,ran pW0,Tq ą 0 and that it is therefore (since CmeanS,ran is
continuous by the results of [38]) possible to choose V and δ ą 0 such that CmeanS,ran pW0,Vq ą 0,
CSpW0,Vq “ 0, and CSpW1,Vq “ 0 whenever dpWδ ,W1q is small enough.
It is easy to see that the AVC W0 does not share this property: Although C
mean
S,ran pW0,Tq ą 0 and
CmeanS,ran pW0,Tq ą 0, it is easy to find explicit examples of AVCs W1 which are arbitrarily close to
W0 but are non-symmetrizable.
Of course, every whatsoever nice characterization of a set of interesting objects is pretty
useless if the set turns out to be empty. Fortunately, it has been proven in [18] that the function
mapping an AVC W to its capacity has discontinuity points by explicit example.
Such an example is also given by pW0,Tq with W0 taken from above.
Remark 5. The capacity CmeanS,ran pW,Vq was quantified in [38]. It satisfies
CmeanS,ran pW,Vq “ lim
GÑ0
CkeypW,V, Gq “ C˚pW,Vq. (64)
The proofs of Theorems 1 and Theorem 2 are carried out by providing coding strategies. The
proof of the direct part of Theorem 2 extends the techniques from [22] by adding constraints on
the random code that lead to it having additional security features. These features are quantified
in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. For any τ ą 0 and β ą 0, there exists a value νpτq ą 0 and an N0pτq such that for
all n ě N0pτq, natural numbers K,L,Γ satisfying K ¨ L ě 2n¨τ and type p P Pn0 pX q satisfying
minx:ppxqą0 ppxq ě β, there exist codewords pxklγqK,L,Γk,l,γ“1 in Tp Ă X n, and a c1 ą 0 such that if
Γ´1 ą expp´2n¨c1q and upon setting R “ 1
n
logpK ¨ Lq we have
max
γ,xn,sn
|tpk, lq : pxn,xklγ , snq P TN¯p¨|xn,xklγ ,snqu| ď 2np|R´Ipxklγ ;x
n,snq|``τq (65)
max
γ,sn
|tpk, lq : Ipxklγ ; snq ě τu| ď K ¨ L ¨ 2´n¨τ (66)
max
γ,sn
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
"
pk, l, γq : There is pk
1, l1, γ1q ‰ pk, l, γq such that
Ipxklγ ;xk1l1γ1 , snq ´ |R ´ Ipxklγ ; snq|` ą τ
*ˇˇˇ
ˇ ď K ¨ L ¨ 2´n¨τ{2 (67)
logL ¨ Γ
n
ě max
qPPpSq
Ipp;Vqq ` τ ñ max
sn,k
››››››
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
Vsnp¨|xklγq ´ EVsnp¨|Xnq
››››››
1
ď 2´n¨νpτq (68)
where Xn is distributed according to PpXn “ xnq :“ 1|Tp|1Tppxnq and the dependence of ν on τ
is such that limτÑ0 νpτq “ 0.
Our intention was be to apply this Lemma to AVWCs for which the link between Alice and
Bob is not symmetrizable. While Lemma 2 contains the possibility to use shared randomness
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Γ, this is not necessary in the application intended by us in this work (we use it only with Γ
set to one). The main reason for keeping Γ as a variable in our proof this is that it allows us to
deliver a unified treatment of the whole topic, increases the generality of the Lemma and does
not require much additional work.
Remark 6. The properties p65q, p66q and p67q of the code are identical to those stated in
[22, Lemma 3]. This Lemma again is the main ingredient to the proof of [22] that non-
symmetrizability (symmetrizability is defined in (3)) is sufficient for message transmission over
AVCs if the average error criterion and non-randomized codes are used. Our strategy thus is
to use the properties p65q, p66q and p67q in Lemma 2 in order to ensure successful message
transmission over the legal link, if W is non-symmetrizable.
The main tool used by Csiszar and Narayan for proving properties p65q, p66q and p67q of Lemma
2 in their work [22] was large deviation theory, and this is where we can make the connection to
our work and prove the additional properties via application of the Chernoff-bound.
Roughly speaking, this method of proof amounts to adding some additional requirements in a sit-
uation where any exponential number of additional requirements can be satisfied simultaneously.
When utilizing Lemma 2 (with Γ “ 1) in the proof of Theorem 2 one sees that while reliable
transmission is achieved via fulfillment of conditions (65), (66) and (67) in Lemma 2 if and
only if the legal link W is non-symmetrizable, the security of the communication can always be
achieved by making L large enough. This implies that there are generic communication systems
(AVWCs with a symmetrizable legal link) for which it is much easier to design codes that convey
little information to Eve than codes which ensure robust communication.
In order to derive from Lemma 1 the connection between symmetrizability and the capac-
ity CS (which is the content of Theorem 2) it is necessary to prove not only achievability of
quantities like e.g. minq Ipp;Wqq´maxs Ipp;Vsq but also of quantities like minq Ipp1;W nq ˝Uq ´
maxsn Ipp1;Vsn ˝ Uq that involve multiple channel uses and pre-coding that is defined via the
optimization problem (4). Such a process of adding pre-coding may unfortunately cause the
AVWC arising from the concatenation of pre-coding and the original AVWC to be symmetriz-
able. This highly interesting interplay of pre-coding and symmetrizability is quantified in the
next Lemma and the following example.
Lemma 3. LetW be an arbitrarily varying channel with input alphabet A, output alphabet B and
state set S. Let T P CpA1,Aq be a channel. Let W1 be the arbitrarily varying channel with input
alphabet A1, output alphabet B and state set R defined by w1pb|a1, sq :“ řaPA wpb|a, sqtpa|a1q (or,
equivalently, via setting W 1s :“ Ws ˝ T for all s P S).
If W is symmetrizable then W1 is symmetrizable as well.
That, even for channels T whose associated matrix ptpa|a1qa1PA1,aPA has full range, the reverse
implication “W1 is symmetrizable ñW is symmetrizable” does not hold came as a surprise and
is proven here by explicit example:
Example 1. Define an AVC W Ă Cptx1, x2u, t1, 2, 3uq by setting
wp¨|s1, x1q :“ δ1, (69)
wp¨|s2, x1q :“ δ2, (70)
wp¨|s1, x2q :“ 0.6δ1 ` 0.2δ2 ` 0.2δ3, (71)
wp¨|s2, x2q :“ 0.1δ1 ` 0.3δ2 ` 0.6δ3, (72)
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where δipjq “ 1 if and only if i “ j holds for i, j P r3s. Then W is non-symmetrizable: The
equation
λwp¨|s1, x1q ` p1´ λqwp¨|s2, x1q “ µwp¨|s1, x2q ` p1´ µqwp¨|s2, x2q (73)
cannot have a solution with λ, µ P r0, 1s because δ3 appears only on the right hand side and with
strictly positive weights.
However, if we add pre-coding by a binary-symmetric channel Np with parameter p P r0, 1s
we obtain the new AVC W1 defined via W 1s :“ Ws ˝Np or, more concretely, by
w1p¨|s1, x1q “ pδ1 ` p1p0.2δ1 ` 0.6δ2 ` 0.2δ3q (74)
w1p¨|s2, x1q “ pδ2 ` p1p0.1δ1 ` 0.3δ2 ` 0.6δ3q (75)
w1p¨|s1, x2q “ p1δ1 ` pp0.6δ1 ` 0.2δ2 ` 0.2δ3q (76)
w1p¨|s2, x2q “ p1δ2 ` pp0.1δ1 ` 0.3δ2 ` 0.6δ3q (77)
where p1 :“ 1´ p. We set p “ 0.4. The equation
λw1p¨|s1, x1q ` p1´ λqw1p¨|s2, x1q “ µw1p¨|s1, x2q ` p1´ µqw1p¨|s2, x2q (78)
can be written out explicitly into three equations for the two parameters µ, λ. The solution is
given by
λ “ 31{37, µ “ 75{148. (79)
This shows that W1 is symmetrizable. The situation is depicted as follows:
‚
‚ ‚
‚
‚
wp¨|s1, x2q
wp¨|s2, x2q
δ1 “ wp¨|s1, x1q
δ2 “ wp¨|s2, x1q δ3
‚
‚ ‚
‚
‚
‚
‚w
1p¨|s2, x2q
w1p¨|s1, x1q
w1p¨|s1, x2q
w1p¨|s2, x1q
δ1
δ2 δ3
Figure 3: Light gray lines are the vertices of the probability simplex Ppt1, 2, 3uq. The sets
convptwp¨|s1, xiq, wp¨|s2, xiquq where i “ 1, 2 are displayed as dashed lines. The intersection of
the dashed lines on the right shows that W1 is symmetrizable.
In order to derive the statement of Theorem 2 from Lemma 2 we can therefore not use a
simple blocking strategy. Rather, we will present two methods of proof. The first employs a
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reasoning along the lines of equations (48) until (57). This approach is based on the concept
of using a few non-secret bits in order to guarantee secrecy for the actual data. While this is
highly interesting from a practical point of view, it does not utilize the full strength of Lemma
2. This proof uses a set of public messages that can be read by Eve but not by James, secrecy
is only obtained for the (exponentially larger) set of private messages.
Our second proof of Theorem 2 is based on lifting the optimal pre-codings for n channel uses to
n` 1 channel uses by using no pre-coding on the pn` 1qth channel use. This type of pre-coding
preserves non-symmetrizability. The second proof makes almost full use of the statements of
Lemma 2, as we still set Γ “ 1. No public messages are used in the construction of the code.
It remains an interesting open question whether, for n channel uses, the optimal channel U
arising from the n-th term of the optimization problem (4) does in fact symmetrize pWsnqsnPSn
or not.
Our next result is potentially the most interesting in this work, since it sheds additional light
on a rather new phenomenon: the super-activation of “the” secrecy capacity of AVWCs.
Theorem 5 (Characterization of super-activation of CS via properties of C
mean
S,ran ). Let
pWi,Viqi“1,2 be AVWCs.
1. If CSpW1,V1q “ CSpW2,V2q “ 0, then the estimate
CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą 0 (80)
is true if and only if W1 bW2 is not symmetrizable and CmeanS,ran pW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą 0.
If pWi,Viqi“1,2 can be super-activated it holds
CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q “ CmeanS,ran pW1 bW2,V1 bV2q. (81)
2. There exist AVWCs which exhibit the above behaviour.
3. If CmeanS,ran shows super-activation for pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q, then CS shows super-
activation for pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q if and only if at least one of W1 or W2 is non-
symmetrizable.
4. If CmeanS,ran shows no super-activation for pW1,V1q and pW2,V2q then super-activation
of CS can only happen if W1 is non-symmetrizable and W2 is symmetrizable and
CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q “ 0 and CmeanS,ran pW2,V2q ą 0. The statement is independent of the specific
labelling.
Remark 7. Of course for W1 bW2 to be non-symmetrizable, it has to be that at least one out
of W1, W2 is non-symmetrizable.
While Theorem 5 offers a complete characterization, it does not give any explicit examples -
fortunately this has already been done in [16], where two AVWCs were used as follows: The first
legal link is modeled by an AVC W1 “ pW1,1,W1,2q with input system for Alice being t1, 2u and
output at Bob’s site being t1, 2, 3u. The transition probabilities were given by
W1,1 “
ˆ
1 0 0
0 0 1
˙J
, W1,2 “
ˆ
0 0 1
0 1 0
˙J
(82)
(note that assume that the columns of a matrix representing a channel sum up to one, not the
rows!) and the first link to the eavesdropper by V1 “ pV1q (no influence from the jammer on
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that link). For the purpose of this example, it would even be sufficient to let V1 “ T. This
channel has the property that W1 is symmetrizable. The second link was chosen to consist of
two binary symmetric channels W2, V2 where W2 was a degraded version of V2, but both had
nonzero capacity. Thus, CSpW2,V2q “ 0 but nontheless it is possible to transmit (non-secret)
messages via W2. This example fits into the third class of pairs of AVWCs described in the
above Theorem 5.
While this explicit example is very interesting, our analysis provides a more systematic analysis.
Note that all our arguments only apply to the strong secrecy criterion. The weak secrecy criterion
can be handled differently, and will be the scope of future work.
As a last point in this section, we would like to discuss connections between Cpp and CS. At
first, let us observe a similarity: The former shows super-activation if and only if the latter shows
super-activation. To see this, we argue as follows: By definition, the class of codes which transmit
public and private messages as defined in Definition 5 includes that according to Definition 7
where no public information is transmitted. Therefore it holds that CpppW,Vq ě CSpW,Vq for
all AVWCs pW,Vq. Further, the definition of private/public codes according to Definition 5 is
more narrow than the one of a common randomness assisted code according to Definition 3, so
that every private/public code is at the same time also a common randomness assisted code.
Especially, the public messages may be treated as if they were common randomness if L “ Γ.
Therefore, CpppW,Vq ą 0 implies that CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ą 0 for all pW,Vq. We conclude from
Theorem 2 that CpppW,Vq ą 0 implies CSpW,Vq ą 0 for all pW,Vq. This leads us to conclude
that
@ pW,Vq : CpppW,Vq ą 0 ô CSpW,Vq ą 0. (83)
Let now Cpp show super-actication on ppW1,V1q, pW2,V2qq. Then it follows from the statement
in equation (83) that both CSpW1,V1q “ CSpW2,V2q “ 0 and CSpW,Vq ą 0. Therefore, super-
activation of Cpp implies super-activation of CS.
In the reverse direction, let CS show super-activation on the pair ppW1,V1q, pW2,V2qq. From
the statement in equation (3) we immediately see that Cpp shows super-activation as well.
Concerning differences, we note that a question we have to leave open is whether there could
exist AVWCs W,V such that CpppW,Vq ą CmeanS,ran pW,Vq holds.
This question is of huge practical importance, as it allows the quantification of the interplay
between private and public communication in interfering networks when i.i.d. assumptions are
not met, as is often the case.
4 Proofs
4.1 Technical definitions and facts
An important part of our results builds on the mathematical structure that was developed
in [22]. The structure of the codes developed there builds on randomly sampling codewords
which are all taken from one and the same set Tp. In our previous paper we used an approach
that was built on sampling codewords according to some pruned distribution p1 defined by
p1pxnq :“ 1
pbnpTnp,δq1T
n
p,δ
¨ pbnpxnq for some p P PpX q. The small deviation of p1 from pbn brings
with it some benefits concerning asymptotic estimates. Since this work uses the outcomes of the
earlier work [38], it would be desirable to use exactly the same technical approach.
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However, due to the intended connection to [22], we cannot use p1 in this work. Instead, we
decided to use the same distribution as the one which was used in [22] which is in some sense
further away from pbn. While this ensures seamless connectivity to [22], it also made us deviate
(compared to for example our previous work [38]) from standard formulations in some other
points, namely: We use a different notion of conditional typicality than before, and we define
typical sets using the relative entropy rather than the one-norm.
This deviation is motivated by the fact that, for any finite alphabet A and p P A as well as type
N¯ P Pn0 pAq, we have pbnpTN¯ q “ polypnq2´n¨Dpp}N¯q for some polynomial poly in n. Therefore,
defining typicality with respect to relative entropy gives the best control on the asymptotic
behaviour of typical sets. All methods that use other distance measures for the definition of
typicality need to relate these other measures to the relative entropy.
That the use of relative entropy is also elegant as compared to other methods can be seen as
follows: Looking at [20, Definition 2.9] (which deals with typicality in the presence of channels
and inputs to those channels) one sees an additional advantage of using relative entropy over
using one-norm: defining typicality with respect to variational distance requires one to add
additional assumptions which are not necessary when relative entropy is used, as the latter
quantity can become infinite.
More precisely, let us assume we are given a channel W P CpA,Bq such and pan, bnq P An ˆ Bn
such that for one specific choice of a, b we have Npa, b|an, bnq ą 0 but wpb|aq “ 0. Then bn is
not a typical output of the channel wbn given that its input was an, since the probability that
it is received when an as sent is zero:
0 ď wbnpbn|anq (84)
“
nź
i“1
wpbi|aiq (85)
ď
ź
i:ai“a,bi“b
wpbi|aiq (86)
“ wpb|aqNpa,b|an,bnq (87)
“ 0Npa,b|an,bnq (88)
“ 0. (89)
Excluding non-typical sequences is crucial for the derivation of lower bounds on cardinality of
the conditionally typical set, for example. Thus, the above sequence bn is excluded from the
w-typical set given an explicitly in [20, Definition 2.9].
A notion using relative entropy captures this perfectly as well, but without necessitating the
explicit exclusion: Let us assume that bn is said to be w- typical given an iff Ωpan, bnq :“
DpN¯p¨|an, bnq}pABq satisfies Ωpan, bnq ď δ for some δ ą 0, where pABpa, bq :“ N¯paqwpb|aq. Then
let an be given and bn be such that there exists a, b such that Npa, b|an, bnq ą 0 but wpb|aq “ 0.
It follows pABpa, bq “ 0 and therefore DpN¯p¨|an, bnq}pABq “ 8, so that Θpxn, ynq “ 8 and
hence bn is not w-typical given an.
A brief look at robust typicality as defined in [35] shows that this quantity is also only related
to relative entropy via inequalities.
Therefore, our definition achieves two goals: It connects in the most direct way to the relevant
probability estimates and can be written down with minimal effort.
Thus, the sets which we will be using frequently in the following are, for arbitrary finite sets
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A,B, C, every p P PpAq, V˜ P CpA ˆ B, Cq and δ ą 0 defined as follows: for a given pan, bnq P
An ˆ Bn we define pABC P PpAˆ B ˆ Cq via pABCpa, b, cq :“ N¯pan, bnqv˜pc|a, bq and
T np,δ :“ tan P An : DpN¯p¨|anq}pq ď δu, (90)
TV˜ ,δpan, bnq :“ tcn : DpN¯p¨|an, bn, cnq}pABCq ď δu. (91)
These definitions are only valid for δ ą 0. Each TV,δpsn, xnq obeys the estimate
v˜bnpTV˜ ,δpanq|anq ě 1´ 2´n¨δ{2, (92)
for all n P N such that |Aˆ B| 1
n
logp2nq ď δ. We set, for every p P PpX q,
Eppq :“ max
qPPpSq
Ipp;Vqq and Bppq :“ min
qPPpSq
Ipp;Wqq. (93)
For the technical part of our proofs, the most important tool will be the Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound:
Lemma 4. Let b be a positive number. Let Z1, . . . , ZL be i.i.d. random variables with values in
r0, bs and expectation EZl “ ν, and let 0 ă ε ă 12 . Then
P
#
1
L
Lÿ
l“1
Zl R rp1˘ εqνs
+
ď 2 exp
ˆ
´L ¨ ε
2 ¨ ν
3 ¨ b
˙
, (94)
where rp1˘ εqνs denotes the interval rp1´ εqν, p1 ` εqνs.
The proof can be found in [25, Theorem 1.1] and in [6].
4.2 Proof of the converse part of Theorem 1 (coding theorem for Ckey)
Main ingredients to this proof are Fano’s inequality, data processing and almost-convexity of
the entropy.
Proof of converse for secret common randomness assisted secrecy capacity. Let a
sequence K “ pKnq8n“1 of common randomness-assisted codes be given such that for all n P N
we have
min
snPSn
1
Γn ¨Kn
Γn,Knÿ
γ,k“1
eγpxn|kqwsnpDγk |xnq ě 1´ ǫn, (95)
max
snPSn
IpKn;Zsnq ď ǫn, (96)
and of course lim supnÑ8 ǫn “ 0. Set R :“ lim infnÑ8 1n logKn, and G :“ limnÑ8 1n log Γn. In
addition to the random variable defined in Definition 3, consider pKn,K1q,n,  nq distributed as
PppKn,Ynq ,K1q,n,  nq “ pk, k1, γqq “
ÿ
snPSn
qbnpsnqPpKn,Yq,n,K1n,  nq. (97)
Then for all n P N, q P PpSq and sn P Sn Fano’s inequality implies
p1´ ǫnq logKn ď IpKn;K1q,n| nq ´ IpKn;Zsnq ` 1` ǫn. (98)
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We can apply the data processing inequality to get
p1´ ǫnq logKn ď IpKn;Ynq | nq ´ IpKn;Zsnq ` 1` ǫn, (99)
and from e.g. Lemma 3.4 in [20] and independence of the random variables Kn and Gn it follows
that the asymptotic scaling of the rate lim infnÑ8 1n logKn can be upper bounded through the
following inequality:
p1´ ǫnq logKn ď IpKn;Ynq q ´ IpKn;Zsnq `Hp nq ` 1` ǫn. (100)
Since this estimate is valid for all q P PpSq and sn P Sn we get
logKn ď 1
1´ ǫn
ˆ
min
qPPpSq
IpKn;Ynq q ´ max
snPSn
IpKn;Zsnq
˙
` 1` ǫn
1´ ǫn `
log Γn
1´ ǫn . (101)
Define the distribution p P PprKnsq and the channel U P CprKns,X nq by
ppkq “ 1
Kn
, Upxn|kq :“
Γnÿ
γ“1
1
Γ
eγpxn|kq pk P rKns, xn P X nq. (102)
Then we arrive at
logKn ď 1
1´ ǫn
ˆ
min
qPPpSq
Ipp;Wbnq ˝ Uq ´ max
snPSn
Ipp;Vsn ˝ Uq
˙
` 1` ǫn
1´ ǫn `
log Γn
1´ ǫn . (103)
Of course, we can obtain a more relaxed upper bound by optimizing over all p P PprKnsq
and U P CprKns,X nq. We then obtain (since Kn ď |X n| for every reliably working code
and, therefore, PprKnsq Ă Ppr|X n|sq under the standard embedding rKns Ă r|X |ns) by further
increasing the size of the input alphabet from Kn to |X |n with Un :“ r|X |ns that
R ď lim
nÑ8
1
n
max
pPUn
max
UPCpUn,Xnq
ˆ
min
qPPpSnq
Ipp;Wbnq ˝ Uq ´ max
snPSn
Ipp;Vsn ˝ Uq
˙
`G. (104)
As it has been proven in [38] that the capacity CmeanS,ran equals the leftmost part in the above sum
we have proven the desired result.
Another obvious bound on the capacity arises by ignoring all security issues: since K ensures an
asymptotically perfect transmission, we have
lim
nÑ8
1
n
logKn ď max
pPPpX q
min
qPPpSq
Ipp;Wqq. (105)
This establishes the converse part of the coding theorem.
4.3 Proof of the direct part of Theorem 1 (coding theorem for Ckey)
Let G ą 0 be given. Define p :“ argmaxpPPpX qpBppq ´ Eppqq. Set G1 :“ maxtEppq, Gu.
Intuitively speaking, this is the amount of common randomness which can be put to use in the
obfuscation of Eve. Choose a τ ą 0 such that νpτq from Lemma 1 satisfies νpτq ă G1. Let
n P N be so that for all n ě N there is pn P Pn0 pX q such that |Bppnq ´ Bppq| ď maxtτ, νpτqu
and |Eppnq´Eppq| ď maxtτ, νpτqu. This can be achieved by approximating p through types pn
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via Lemma 8 and since both B and E are continuous functions. Take three sequences pKnq8n“1,
pLnq8n“1, pΓnq8n“1 of natural numbers. Without loss of generality, we can ensure that pΓnqnPN
satisfies both Γn ď 2n¨G1 for all n P N and limnÑ8 1n log Γn “ G1. Let now n P N satisfying
n ě N be fixed but large enough such that in addition
Eppq ´G1 ` 4τ ě 1
n
logpLnq ě Eppq ´G1 ` 2τ, (106)
Bppq ´ Eppq `G1 ´ 4pτ ` νpτqq ě 1
n
logpKnq ě Bppq ´Eppq `G1 ´ 2pτ ` νpτqq (107)
be satisfied, for all large enough n P N. This implies both
1
n
logpKn ¨ Lnq ď Bppq ´ Eppq `G1 ´ 4pτ ` νpτqq ` Eppq ´G1 ` 4τ (108)
“ Bppq ´ 4νpτq (109)
ď Bppnq ´ νpτq (110)
and
1
n
logpLn ¨ Γnq ě Eppq ` 2τ ě Eppnq ` τ. (111)
Asymptotically, we also have this yields
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
logpKnq ě Bppq ´Eppq `G´ 4 ¨ pτ ` νpτqq. (112)
At the same time, the prerequisites of Lemma 1 are met such that a reliable sequence of codes
exists which is also secure with respect to } ¨ }1: For all large enough n P N we have
min
sn
Γÿ
γ“1
1
Γ
K,Lÿ
k,l“1
1
K ¨ LwsnpD
γ
kl|xklγq ě 1´ 2´n¨νpτq, (113)
max
sn,k
››››››
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
vsnp¨|xklγq ´ Evsnp¨|Xnq
››››››
1
ď2´n¨νpτq. (114)
It can already be seen that this yields reliable communication at any rate which is strictly below
Bppq´Eppq`G - we proved the achievability of rates close enough to Bppq´Eppq`G, but it is
clear that time sharing between a trivial strategy where only one codeword is being transmitted
(which is then automatically perfectly secure) and the strategy which was proven to work in
the above will show achievability of all other rates R P r0, |Bppq ´ Eppq ` G|`s. That we also
get secure communication can be seen as follows: From [20, Lemma 2.7] we know that our
exponential bound (62) asymptotically leads to fulfillment of the strong secrecy criterion.
We have thus proven that, for each τ 1 ą 0, the number
max
pPPpX q
ˆ
min
qPPpSq
Ipp;Wqq ´ max
qPPpSq
Ipp;Vqq
˙
`G´ τ 1 (115)
is an achievable rate. We now proceed by adding channels U at the sender and using blocks
of the original channels together: Since we now know that, for every r P N, G ą 0 and δ ą 0,
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p P PpUrq where Ur :“ r|X |rs and U P CpUr,X rq there exist sequences K “ pKmq8m“1 such that
for every sr¨m P pSrqm “ Sr¨m we have
1
Km
1
Γm
Kmÿ
k“1
Γmÿ
γ“1
ÿ
xr¨m
epxr¨m|k, γqwsm¨r pDγk |xr¨mq ě 1´ ǫm, (116)
where xk,γ P Umr are codewords (each xk,γ,i is an element of Ur) for pWsr ˝ UqsrPSr , and the
stochastic encoder is epxr¨m|k, γq “śmi“1 upxij |xk,γ,iq for xr¨m and it holds that
lim inf
mÑ8
1
m
logKm ě min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Uq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq ` r ¨G´ δ. (117)
We can define values tn P t0, . . . , r ´ 1u by requiring n “ m ¨ r ` tn for them to hold for some
suitably chosen m “ mpnq P N. This quantity satisfies ´1`n{r ď mpnq ď n{r. For every n P N
we then define new decoding sets by
Dˆ
γ
k :“ Dγk ˆ Ytn (118)
and new codewords by setting for some arbitrary but fixed xtn
xˆkγ :“ pxkγ , xtnq. (119)
From the choice of codewords and the decoding rule it is clear that this code is asymptoti-
cally reliable. The asymptotic number of codewords (mind that Kˆn “ Kmpnq) calculated and
normalized with respect to n, is
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
log Kˆn “ lim inf
nÑ8
1
mpnq ¨ r ` tn logKmpnq (120)
ě lim inf
nÑ8
1
r
¨ 1
mpnq ` 1 logKmpnq (121)
“ lim inf
nÑ8
1
r
¨ 1
mpnq ¨
mpnq
mpnq ` 1 ¨ logKmpnq (122)
“ 1
r
lim inf
nÑ8
1
mpnq ¨ logKmpnq (123)
“ 1
r
ˆ
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Uq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq ` r ¨G´ δ
˙
. (124)
To see that every number C˚pW,Vq ´ ǫ is an achievable rate, take r, U and p such that
C˚pW,Vq ´ ǫ{2 ď 1
r
ˆ
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Uq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq
˙
. (125)
This is possible since in [38] it was (in addition to the equality CmeanS,ran p¨, ¨q “ C˚p¨, ¨q) proven that
C˚pW,Vq “ lim
rÑ8
1
r
max
pPPpUnq
max
UnPCpU ,Xnq
ˆ
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Uq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq
˙
. (126)
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We set δ “ r ¨ ǫ{4. Then from our preceding arguments it becomes clear that there is a sequence
Kˆ of asymptotically reliable codes at an asymptotic rate
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
log Kˆn ě 1
r
ˆ
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wmq ˝ Uq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq ` r ¨G´ r ¨ ǫ{4
˙
(127)
ě 1
r
ˆ
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wmq ˝ Uq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq ` r ¨G
˙
´ ǫ{4 (128)
ě C˚pW,Vq `G´ ǫ{2´ ǫ{4 (129)
ě C˚pW,Vq `G´ ǫ. (130)
This proves the direct part of the coding theorem.
4.4 An intermediate result
We now have to prove the core results from which all the other statements can be deduced.
The idea of proof will be to make a random selection of the codewords xklγ where k are the
messages, l are non-secret messages which are only being sent in order to obfuscate the received
signal at Eve, and γ are the values of the common randomness. When applying the results
to AVWCs, the decoder is the one defined in [22] whenever we study CS and is defined here
according to our needs for the study of Ckey.
We define events E1, . . . , E5 which describe certain desirable properties of our codewords, in
dependence of pW,Vq and the numbers K,L,Γ of available indices k, l, γ. We then use Chernoff
bounds. This guarantees that the random selection of codewords has each single property we
would like them to have with probability lower bounded by 1 ´ expp´2ncq for some positive
constant c ą 0 and all large enough n under some conditions on Γ, L and K which of course
depend on pW,Vq as well. Application of a union bound then reveals the existence of one
particular choice of codewords that has all the desired properties simultaneously.
Using exactly this method of proof, Csiszar and Narayan [22, Lemma 3] proved properties
p65q, p66q and p67q of Lemma 2. Thus what remains for us is to provide proof that the remaining
event p68q has high probability.
In [22], large deviation results for dependent random variables were employed, but the
underlying probability employed in codeword selection was the same as the one used by us, so
that our findings connect seamlessly.
We become a bit more concrete now. Let p P Pn0 pAq, q P Pn0 pSq. Throughout, we will
attempt to twist and tweak asymptotic quantities such that they are calculated with respect to
the random variables pS,X,Zq defined via PppS,X,Zq “ ps, x, zqq :“ ppxqqpsqvpz|x, sq. Since
the distribution of pS,X,Zq is so important, we label it by pSXZ . The variable p will remain
fixed, and q will always denote a type corresponding to one of the choices of James.
The proof will require us to draw codewords at random. As stated already, we adapt this
procedure to the one chosen in [22]. This is done as follows: We define the random vari-
ables Xklγ (1 ď k ď K, 1 ď l ď L, 1 ď γ ď Γ) by PpXklγ “ xnq :“ 1|Tp|1Tppxnq for all
k P rKs, l P rLs γ P rΓs and xn P X n, where K,L,Γ are natural numbers. We write xklγ for
the realizations of the variable Xklγ , instead of x
n
klγ . The random variable X :“ pXklγqK,L,Γk,l,γ“1 is
distributed such that each Xklγ is independent of Xk1l1γ1 if pk, l, γq ‰ pk1, l1, γ1q. The realizations
of pXklγqK,L,Γk,l,γ“1 are written x. We use the projections πklγ defined by πklγpxq :“ xklγ . Further
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projections as e.g. xγ :“ πγpxq :“ pxklγqK,Lk,l“1 are defined wherever there is a need.
In order to enhance readability, we will not only omit the superscript n in our codewords,
but from time to time we will also write statements like @sn, property P holds. Then, it is
understood that P holds for all sn P Sn.
When calculating expectations of any of the Xklγ we need no reference to k, l, γ due to
independence of our random variables. We therefore add another random variable, Xn,
distributed as PpXn “ xnq “ 1|Tp|1Tppxnq as well.
A first and crucial step for all that is to come in the proofs of the technical Lemmas 1 and
2 is to fix some δ ą 0 and p P PpX q and define, for all sn P Sn and zn P Zn, the functions
Θsn,zn : X
n Ñ r0, bs (where b :“ 2´npHpZ|X,Sq´f2pn,δqq for some function f2, as we will see soon)
by
Mpsn, znq :“ txn P Tp : DpN¯ p¨|sn, xn, znq}pSXZq ď δu (131)
Θsn,znpxnq :“ vbnpzn|sn, xnq1Mpsn,znq. (132)
In order to enhance readability, the dependence of both M and Θ on δ is suppressed here and in
the following. All our proofs rely on a common strategy, which only deviates in one point: The
codes which ensure reliable transmission. For non-symmetrizable AVWCs we rely on the work
[22] and use the codes which are defined therein. This will be sufficient to obtain all the results
that we claimed for the uncorrelated coding secrecy capacity.
The coding theorem for secret common randomness assisted secrecy capacity needs an additional
definition of codes. This definition is as follows:
For every n P N, set Ξn :“ Pn0 pSq. For every xn, define (not necessarily disjoint) “decoding”
sets by
Dˆxn :“
ď
ξPΞn
TWξ,δpxnq (133)
and for a collection xγ :“ pxklγqK,Lk,l“1 of codewords with fixed value of γ set
Dpxγqkl :“ Dˆxklγ
č˜ď
k1‰k
ď
l1‰l
Dˆxk1l1γ
¸A
. (134)
This defines the code Kn. This definition allows the decoder to decode the randomization index
l as well, an approach which works for AVWCs and compound (wiretap) channels with convex
state sets via the minimax theorem. Note that this code will only ensure reliable transmission
if Γ is sufficiently large.
In order to deliver a joint treatment of the subject it makes sense to define the following events,
where we implicitly assume a functional dependence δ “ δpτq that will be specified more exactly
later during our proofs. The sets E3, . . . , E5 depend only on τ , whereas E1 depends also on W
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and E2 on V.
E1 :“
$&
%x|@sn, zn, k : 1L ¨ Γ
Lÿ
l,γ“1
Θsn,znpxklγq P rp1˘ 2´n¨τ{4qEΘsn,zns
,.
- (135)
E2 :“
#
x|min
sn
1
Γ
Γÿ
γ“1
dsnpKγq ě 1´ 2 ¨ 2´nδ{4
+
. (136)
E3 :“
"
x| max
γ,xn,sn
|tpk, lq : pxn,xklγ , snq P TN¯p¨|xn,xklγ ,snqu| ď 2np|R´Ipxklγ ;x
n,snq|``τq
*
(137)
E4 :“
"
x|max
γ,sn
|tpk, lq : Ipxklγ ; snq ą τu| ď K ¨ L ¨ 2´n¨τ
*
(138)
E5 :“
"
x|max
γ,sn
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
"
pk, l, γq : There is pk
1, l1, γ1q ‰ pk, l, γq such that
Ipxklγ ;xk1l1γ1 , snq ´ |R´ Ipxklγ ; snq|` ą τ
*ˇˇˇ
ˇ ď K ¨ L ¨ 2´n¨τ{2
*
(139)
The average success probability dsnpKγq was defined in Definition 3. The events E3, E4, E5 are
proven to have high probability in [22] (actually, their proof is valid for |Γ| “ 1 but can be
extended to arbitrary |Γ| by simple union bounds, which leads to the following statement:
Lemma 5 (Cf. [22]). There is c1 ą 0 such that, if W is non-symmetrizable, we have that
PpE3 X E4 X E5q ě 1´ Γ ¨ expp´2n¨c1q (140)
The bound in Lemma 5 is trivial whenever Γ ą expp2n¨c1q. In the applications intended here,
the maximal scaling of Γ with n will be exponential, so that nontrivial bounds arise.
Our main effort in the following will be to show that a similar bound is true for PpE1q and
PpE2q under the right conditions on K,L and Γ. With respect to these conditions, any of the
intersections Ei X . . . X Ej will then have very high probability as well.
For the proofs of both Lemma 1 and 2 it will be of importance to control the amount of
information which leaks out to Eve. This will require us to prove that a careful random choice
of codewords will be provably secure, and this is the main content of the following Lemma
(which contains statements concerning the message transmission capabilities of the common
randomness assisted codes defined in (133) and (134) as well).
Lemma 6. Let K,L,Γ P N. Let the random variable X be as described above. Then for every
τ ą 0 and β ą 0 there is a δ ą 0 and and N P N such that for all n ě N and types p P Pn0 pX q,
the following statements are true:
1. If 1
n
logpL ¨ Γq ě Eppq ` τ and minx:ppxqą0 ppxq ě β, then
PpE1q ě 1´ 2 ¨ |S ˆ X ˆ Z|n ¨ expp´2n¨τ{6q.
2. If 1
n
logpK ¨ Lq ď Bppq ´ δ ´ 2 ¨ f1p
?
2 ¨ δq then PpE2q ě 1´ exppn ¨ logp|S|q ´ Γ ¨ 2´nδq.
3. For every β ą 0, |X |, |S| and |Z|, a functional dependence between δ and τ can be chosen
such that limτÑ0 δpτq “ 0.
The number N depends on |X |, |S|, |Z| as well as on p (via the quantity β :“ minxPX :ppxqą0 ppxq)
and on δ.
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Proof. Some of the statements we wish to prove here are not about the full random variable
X “ pXklγqK,L,Γk,l,γ“1 but only about exponentially many parts of it. We do therefore feel the need
to write a few lines concerning our strategy of proof. We adopt the usual point of view that X
somehow generates matrices of codewords. In the special case treated here it will be convenient
to think of realizations of X as a list of Γ matrices, all of which describe a code-book and each of
these code-books uses the index l solely for making Eve obfuscated, while k is used to transmit
messages. The fact that γ is known to both the sender and the receiver lets the receiver adapt
his decoder appropriately, while Eve only sees the average over all code-books. The effective
randomness used for obfuscation of Eve is therefore L ¨ Γ.
Before making this more precise, we need additional notation:
As stated already, the projections πklγ : pX nqKLΓ Ñ X n project onto the copy of Xn corre-
sponding to k, l, γ, such that πklγpXq “ Xklγ . Accordingly, πk are the projections mapping X
to Xk :“ pXklγqL,Γl,γ“1.
The trick will be to first understand how to embed statements concerning only certain projec-
tions of X into the whole random selection process. The idea is to proceed as follows:
Take any set of functions g1, . . . , gM : X
n Ñ r0, b1s. Then for all k P rKs,
Pp 1
Γ ¨ L
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
gmpπklγpXqq R rp1 ˘ ǫqEgmsq “ Pp 1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
gmpπlγpXkqq R rp1˘ ǫqEgmsq, (141)
where the left hand side is a probabilistic statement about X “ pXklγqK,L,Γk,l,γ“1 and the right hand
side is a statement about the random variables Xk “ pXklγqL,Γl,γ“1. Thus by the usual Chernoff
bound Lemma 4 we have
P
¨
˝D m,k : 1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
gmpπlγpXkqq R rp1 ˘ ǫqEgms
˛
‚ď 2 ¨M ¨K ¨ expˆ´L ¨ Γ ¨ ǫ2 ¨minm Egm
3 ¨ b1
˙
.
(142)
Another crucial connection in what is to follow is that for all zn, xn and sn we have (using the
abbreviation Np¨q :“ Np¨|sn, xn, znq and rpz|x, sq :“ Nps, x, zq{Nps, x|sn, xnq):
vbnpzn|sn, xnq “ 2n¨
ř
s,x,z N¯ps,x,zq log vpz|s,xq (143)
“ 2n¨p
ř
s,x,z N¯ps,x,zqplog vpz|s,xqppxqqpsqN¯ps,x,zq `log
N¯ps,x,zq
ppxqqpsq
qq
(144)
“ 2n¨p´DpN¯p¨|sn,xn,znq}pXSZq`
ř
s,x,z N¯ps,x,zq logp N¯ps,x|s
n,xnq¨rpz|x,sq
ppxq¨qpsq
q
(145)
“ 2n¨p´DpN¯p¨|sn,xn,znq}pXSZq`DpN¯p¨|sn,xnq}pbqq´HpZˆ |Sˆ,Xˆqq, (146)
where SˆXˆZˆ is distributed according to N¯ (note that without loss of generality we may assume
that p, q ą 0 here and in the following lines, since otherwise we could simply erase a symbol
from the alphabet X or S).
Proof of property 1 of Lemma 6: Let n P N. Replace M with Sn ˆ Zn and the
functions gm with the Θsn,zn ’s. We let δ ą 0 be arbitrary for the moment. Using equation (143)
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and the fact that the relative entropy is never negative it can be seen that each Θsn,zn obeys
Θsn,znpxnq “ 2n¨p´DpN¯p¨|sn,xn,znq}pXSZq`DpN¯p¨|sn,xnq}pbqq´HpZˆ |XSqq1Mpsn,znqpxnq (147)
ď 2´n¨pHpZˆ|SˆXˆq´DpN¯p¨|sn,xnq}pbqqq. (148)
This bound does obviously still depend on xn. But if xn P Mpsn, znq then the distribution of
SˆXˆZˆ has the following important feature: by Pinsker’s inequality, we have
}N¯ ´ pSXZ}1 ď
?
2δ. (149)
Setting f2pδq :“ 2 ¨ f1p
?
2δq ` δ, an application of Lemma 11 from the appendix together with
monotonicity of the relative entropy then yields
@ xn P X n : Θsn,znpxnq ď 2´n¨pHpZ|XSq´f2pδqq. (150)
Here, f1 is defined setting A “ S ˆ X ˆ Z. This justifies our choice of b. Note that the
definition of Θ together with the monotonicity of Dp¨}¨q ensures that the empirical distribution
N¯p¨|xn, snq is almost product (N¯ p¨, ¨|xn, snq « pp¨q ¨ N¯p¨|snq) and that this property was vital
in the derivation of the results contained in [22], whereas it may not be strictly necessary here
(but does lead to a valid strategy of proof, nonetheless).
In order to apply the Chernoff bound we also need to calculate the expectation of each Θsn,zn ,
and for that matter it will be important to obtain a tight enough lower bound on |Mpsn, znq|:
According to Lemma 9 from the appendix (set A “ X and B “ S ˆ Z there) we have
|Mpsn, znq| ě 2npHpXˆ |SˆZˆq´fCpnqq. (151)
We are now almost ready to give a lower bound on the expectation of Θsn,zn . Be aware that
sn of type q and zn remain fixed quantities for the moment. From monotonicity of the relative
entropy and Pinsker’s inequality applied together with Lemma 11 it follows that we can estimate
xn PMpsn, znq ñ vbnpzn|sn, xnq ě 2´npHpZ|X,Sq`2δ`f1p
?
2δqq. (152)
It then follows that, if Mpsn, znq ‰ H, we have the estimate
EΘsn,zn “ 1|Tp|
ÿ
xnPMpsn,znq
vbnpzn|xn, snq (153)
ě 2´npHpZ|X,Sq`2δ`f1p
?
2δqq ¨ 2npHpXq´fC pnqq|Mpsn, znq|. (154)
Estimate (149) together with the continuity of entropy yields (see [20, Lemma 2.7])
Mpsn, znq ‰ H ñ |Mpsn, znq| ě 2npHpX|S,Zq`fCpnq`f1p
?
2δqq. (155)
We define m : Sn ˆ Zn Ñ t0, 1u by mpsn, znq “ 1 if Mpsn, znq ‰ H and mpsn, znq “ 0 else. It
then follows that for all large enough n P N
EΘsn,zn ě mpsn, znq ¨ 2´npHpZ|Sq´f3pn,δqq, (156)
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where f3pδq :“ 4pδ ` f1p
?
2δq. For our random variable X this can be used as follows: via the
Chernoff bound,
PpDk, sn, zn : 1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
Θsn,znpπklγpXqq R rp1˘ ǫqEΘsn,znsq (157)
ď 2 ¨ |S ˆ X ˆ Z|n ¨ exp
ˆ
´ǫ2 ¨ L ¨ Γ ¨ minsn,zn EΘsn,zn
3 ¨ b
˙
(158)
“ cpnq ¨ exp
ˆ
´ǫ2 ¨ Γ ¨ L ¨ minsn,zn EΘsn,zn
3 ¨ b
˙
, (159)
on account of the same argument that we used in equations (141) and (142) and with the
obvious definition of cpnq. Now we have to plug in the asymptotic behaviour of L ¨Γ, ǫ and b. If
mpsn, znq “ 0 then the statement is trivial. We set fpδq :“ f2pδq ` f3pδq, Eppq :“ maxq Ipp;Vqq
and let 1
n
logL ¨ Γ ě Eppq ` τ for some τ ą 0. Note that, no matter what the distribution of S
(which depends on the choice sn of James!), we have Eppq ´ IpX;Z|Sq ě 0. Therefore,
ǫ2
3
¨ L ¨ Γ ¨ EΘsn,zn
b
ě mpsn, znqǫ
2
3
¨ 2npEppq`τ´HpZ|Sq`HpZ|X,Sq´f2pδq´f3pδqq (160)
“ mpsn, znqǫ
2
3
¨ 2npEppq`τ´IpZ;X|Sq´fpδqq (161)
ě mpsn, znqǫ
2
3
¨ 2npEppq`τ´Eppq´fpδqq (162)
“ mpsn, znqǫ
2
3
¨ 2npτ´fpδqq. (163)
Upon choosing ǫ “ 2´n¨α we get a doubly exponential decay of the probability in equation (157)
if 0 ą τ ´ 2α´ fpδq, and since limδÑ0 fpδq “ 0 there is a combination of δ ą 0, τ ą 0 such that
for α “ τ{6 and all large enough n P N we have
P
¨
˝D k, sn, zn : 1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
Θsn,znpxklγq R rp1˘ 2´nτ{6qEΘsn,zns
˛
‚ď cpnq ¨ expp´2n¨τ{6q. (164)
It is clear that this defines a dependence δ “ δpτq and that limτÑ0 δpτq “ 0 and δpτq ą 0 for all
(small enough) τ . A specific choice that we will use here is δpτq “ τ .
Proof of statement 2 of Lemma 6: We will need Ahlswede’s robustification technique.
Lemma 7 ([3, 4]). If a function f : Sn Ñ r0, 1s satisfiesÿ
snPSn
fpsnqqps1q ¨ ¨ ¨ qpsnq ě 1´ ε (165)
for all q P Pn0 pSq and some ε P r0, 1s, then
1
n!
ÿ
πPΠn
fpπpsnqq ě 1´ 3 ¨ pn` 1q|S| ¨ ε. (166)
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We will in the following make use of the codes Kγ which defined the set E2.
We would like to use the Chernoff bound for the variable Γ, so we have to control the expectation
for each fixed γ. Note that the construction of codes is such that it is independent from γ, so
this will not turn into a hopeless case if we draw an independent number Γ of realizations of
above codes. We go as follows: First associate to any given choice xγ “ pxklγqK,Lk,l“1 of codewords
the corresponding code Kpxγq as defined in equations (133) and (134). Then, for every sn and
γ P rΓs, define the success probability of that code via
dsnpxγq :“
K,Lÿ
k,l“1
1
K ¨ LwsnpDpxγqkl|xklγq. (167)
We then have for each fixed γ
EdsnpXγq “ E 1
K ¨ L
K,Lÿ
k,l“1
wsnpDpXγqkl|Xklγq (168)
ě E 1
K ¨ L
K,Lÿ
k,l“1
˜
wsnpDˆXklγ |Xklγq ´ wsnp
ď
k1‰k
ď
l1‰l
DˆXk1l1γ |Xklγq
¸
(169)
ě
ÿ
xnPTp
1
|Tp|ws
npDˆxn |xnq ´K ¨ L ¨
ÿ
xn,xˆnPTp
1
|Tp|2ws
npDˆxn |xˆnq. (170)
Now observe that πpTpq “ Tp for every π P Sn and that, for all π P Sn, xn, yn and sn we have
wsnpπpynq|πpxnqq “ wπ´1psnqpyn|xnq. In addition to that, Dˆπpxnq “ πpDˆxnq, so that we can write
EdsnpXγq ě 1
n!
ÿ
πPSn
wsnpDˆπpxnq|πpxnqq ´K ¨ L ¨
ÿ
xn,xˆnPTp
1
|Tp|2ws
npDˆxn |xˆnq. (171)
By Lemma 2.3 and equation (2.1) in [20], the density 1|Tp|1Tp satisfies
1
|Tp|1Tp ď pn` 1q
|X |2´n¨Hppq1Tp (172)
“ pn` 1q|X |pbn1Tp (173)
ď pn` 1q|X |pbn. (174)
Setting plpnq :“ pn` 1q|X |, we use this to further develop our bound as follows:
EdsnpXγq ě 1
n!
ÿ
πPSn
wsnpDˆπpxnq|πpxnqq ´K ¨ L ¨ plpnq ¨
ÿ
xnPTp
1
|Tp|w
bn
p pDˆxn |snq (175)
“ 1
n!
ÿ
πPSn
wsnpDˆπpxnq|πpxnqq ´K ¨ L ¨ plpnq ¨
ÿ
πPSn
1
n!
wbnp pDˆxn |πpsnqq, (176)
where xn P Tp is arbitrary and wppy|sq “
ř
xPX ppxqwpy|s, xq according to our definition in
equation (11). By carrying out the same estimate as in equation (172) for the distribution
1
|Tq|1Tq induced by the type q of s
n and setting pl2pnq :“ pn ` 1q2¨maxt|X |,|S|u we get (note here
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that wpbqpyq :“
ř
s,x qpsq ¨ ppxq ¨ wpy|s, xq defines, according to our convention, a probability
distribution on PpYq which is identical to W ppb qq)
EdsnpXγq ě 1
n!
ÿ
πPSn
wsnpDˆπpxnq|πpxnqq ´K ¨ L ¨ pl2pnq ¨ wbnpbqpDˆxnq (177)
“ 1
n!
ÿ
πPSn
wπpsnqpDˆxn |xnq ´K ¨ L ¨ pl2pnq ¨ wbnpbqpDˆxnq (178)
ě 1
n!
ÿ
πPSn
wπpsnqpDˆxn |xnq ´K ¨ L ¨ pl2pnq ¨max
ξPΞn
wbnpbqpTWξ,δpxnqq. (179)
It is now the time to apply Ahlswede’s robustification technique. For the fixed but arbitrary
xn P Tp define f by fixing all its values fpsnq via fpsnq :“ wsnpDˆxn |xnq. Then by Lemma 7 we
get
EdsnpXγq ě 1´ pn` 1q|S|max
ξPΞn
wbnξ pDˆAxn |xnq ´K ¨ L ¨ pl2pnq ¨max
ξPΞn
wbnpbqpTWξ,δpxnqq (180)
ě 1´ pl2pnq
ˆ
max
ξPΞn
Wbnξ pTWξ,δpxnqA|xnq` (181)
`K ¨ L ¨max
ξPΞn
wbnpbqpTWξ,δpxnqq
˙
(182)
ě 1´ pl2pnq
˜
2´n¨δ{2 `K ¨ L ¨max
ξPΞn
ź
xPX
w
bn¨ppxq
pbq pTWξpxq,δq
¸
. (183)
The last term in above estimate deserves special attention. Following the lines of proof of Lemma
3 in [9] (which was originally proven in [42]) we see that
DpN¯p¨|ynq}Wξppqq “ Dp
ÿ
x
ppxqN¯xp¨|ynq}Wξppqq (184)
ď
ÿ
x
ppxqDpNxp¨|xn, ynq}Wξppqq (185)
“ DpN¯ p¨|xn, ynq}Wξppq b pq (186)
ď δ. (187)
It follows that for each ξ P Ξn we have by Lemma 11 that
WbnpbqpTWξ,δpxnqq ď |TWξ,δpxnq| max
ynPTWξ,δpxnq
wbnpbqpynq (188)
ď |TWξ,δpxnq| max
ynPTWξ,δpxnq
2´npDpN¯p¨|y
nq}W ppbqqq`HpN¯p¨|ynqqq (189)
ď |TWξ,δpxnq|2´npHpWξppqq´f1p
?
2¨δqq. (190)
We further estimate that for the distribution pXY,ξ P PpX ˆ Yq defined via pXY px, yq :“
ppxqwξpy|xq we have
|TWξ,δpxnq| ď max
yn:DpN¯p¨|xn,ynq}pXY,ξqďδ
|tyˆn : Np¨|yˆn, xnq “ Np¨|yn, xnqu| (191)
ď max
yn:DpN¯p¨|xn,ynq}pXY,ξqďδ
2n¨HpYˆ |Xˆq (192)
ď 2n¨
ř
x ppxqHpWξpδxqq`f1p
?
2¨δq, (193)
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by Lemma 9 and Lemma 11. We can now re-insert this estimate into our original problem and
obtain
EdsnpXγq ě 1´ pl2pnq
´
2´n¨δ `K ¨ L ¨ 2´npminξ Ipp;Wξq´2f1p
?
2¨δqq
¯
(194)
ě 1´ pl2pnq
´
2´n¨δ{2 `K ¨ L ¨ 2´npminq Ipp;Wqq´2¨f1p
?
2¨δqq
¯
(195)
ě 1´ pl2pnq
´
2´n¨δ{2 ` 2´n¨δ{2
¯
(196)
ě 1´ 2´n¨δ{4 (197)
for all large enough n P N, since
K ¨ L ď 2npminq Ipp;Wqq´δ´2¨f1p
?
2¨δqq ď 2npminξ Ipp;Wξq´δ´2¨f1p
?
2¨δqq (198)
by assumption and since Ξn Ă PpSq. Observe that this lower bound is entirely independent
from the choice of sn P Sn. It now follows from the Chernoff bound Lemma 4 that
Pp@sn : 1
Γ
Γÿ
γ“1
dsnpKγq ď p1´ ǫqEdsnpKqq ď |S|n ¨ expp´Γ ¨ ǫ2 ¨ EdsnpKq{3q (199)
ď exppn ¨ logp|S|q ´ Γ ¨ ǫ2 ¨ p1´ 2´n¨δ{4q{3q. (200)
Choose ǫ “ 2´n¨δ{4 to obtain the statement.
Proof of statement 3 in Lemma 6: The proof of this statement follows from the
proof of statement 1 where the functional dependence τ ÞÑ δpτq is specified.
4.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. We know from Lemma 6 that (if 1
n
logpK ¨ Lq ď Bppq ´ δ ´ 2 ¨ f1p
?
2 ¨ δq for
some δ ą 0 and n is large enough)
PpE2q ě 1´ exppn ¨ logp|S|q ´ Γ ¨ ǫ2 ¨ p1
3
´ 2´n¨δ{2qq. (201)
Stepping away from the goal of proving Lemma 1 we see that there are two possible routes
which diverge from here. One is to make Γ as small as possible, the other will be to exploit
large numbers Γ. We will soon go on with the second approach and thereby prove Lemma 1, but
first let us assume that we want Γ to be as small as possible (in an asymptotic sense of course).
How can we achieve this? We take any sequence pǫnqnPN of numbers ǫn P r0, 1s which converges
to zero. Depending on such a choice, we set Γn “ 3 ¨ logp|S|2q nǫ2n p1 ´ 2
´nδq. It follows for the
average success probability dsnpKγq as defined in Definition 3 that
Pp @sn : 1
Γ
Γÿ
γ“1
dsnpKγq ď p1´ ǫqEdsnpKq q ă 1, (202)
proving the existence of a sequence of codes for which
min
snPSn
1
Γn ¨K ¨ L
Γn,K,Lÿ
γ,k,l“1
wsnpDkγ |xkγq ě 1´ ǫn (203)
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(whenever Γn scales asymptotically as Γn « nǫ2n ). If ǫn “ n
´ν for some small number ν ą 0 for
example we get Γn « nn´2ν “ n1`2ν . This type of asymptotic scaling of common randomness
has been observed several times now in the literature, and obviously raises the question whether
Γn “ const ¨ n would be sufficient to guarantee asymptotically optimal performance, for some
sufficiently large number const depending only on |S|, for example.
We can now proceed our proof of Lemma 1 by using equation (200) together with Lemma 6 and
a union bound: Let β ą 0 and τ ą 0. From now on until the end of this proof, let δ “ δpτq. Let
1
n
logpΓn ¨ Lnq ě Eppq ` τ, Bppq ´ δ ´ 2 ¨ f1p
?
2 ¨ δq ě 1
n
logpKn ¨ Lnq. (204)
It then follows that for all large enough n it holds that
PpE1 X E2q ą 0. (205)
Thus, there is a realization x of X such that for this particular realization we have
@sn, zn, k : 1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
Θsn,znpxklγq P rp1˘ 2´nτ{4qEΘsn,zns (206)
min
snPSn
1
Γ
Γÿ
γ“1
dsnpKγq ě 1´ 2 ¨ 2´nδ{2 (207)
Further, for every k P rKns we have (setting ∆psn, zn, xnq :“ Θsn,znpxnq for all sn, zn and xn)››››››
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
vsnp¨|xklγq ´ Evsn
››››››
1
(208)
ď
››››››
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
pvsnp¨|xklγq ´∆psn, ¨,xklγq
››››››
1
`
››››››
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
∆psn, ¨,xklγq ´ E∆psn, ¨,Xnq
››››››
1
(209)
` }Epvsnp¨|Xnq ´ E∆psn, ¨,Xnq}1 (210)
ď 1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
}vsnp¨|xklγq ´∆psn, ¨,xklγq}1 ` 2´n¨τ{4 ` E }vsnp¨|Xnq ´∆psn, ¨,Xnq}1 (211)
where the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality of } ¨ }1 and the second one due to the
specific probabilistic choice of x, especially the validity of (206). We now use the definition of
Θsn,zn in order to derive bounds on the remaining quantities: for every x
n P Tp we have
}vsnp¨|xnq ´∆psn, ¨, xnq}1 “
ÿ
zn:DpN¯p¨|sn,xn,zn}pSXZqąδ
vbnpzn|sn, xnq (212)
“ vbnpTV,δpsn, xnqA|sn, xnq (213)
ď 2´n¨δ{2, (214)
for all large enough n. Thus
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
}vsnp¨|xklγq ´∆psn, ¨,xklγq}1 ` E}vsnp¨|Xnq ´∆psn, ¨,Xnq}1 ď 2 ¨ 2´nδ{2 (215)
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for all large enough n P N so that we ultimately get (uniformly in k P rKs) the bound
1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
}vsnp¨|xklγq ´∆psn, ¨,xklγq}1 ď 2 ¨ 2´nδ{2 ` 2´nτ{4 ď 2´n¨νpτq, (216)
for all large enough n and setting νpτq :“ mintδpτq, τu{5 (note that νpτq “ τ{5 is a valid
choice).
4.6 Proof of Theorems 2, 3 and 4 (properties of CS)
Proof of Theorem 2. We give the proof of the properties of CS in the same order as they were
stated in the theorem:
1. This is clear from [27] where it was proven that symmetrizability makes it impossible
to reach reliable transmission of messages.
2. The strategy of proof is to use Lemma 2 with Γ “ 1. The reason for this is that,
by assumption, W is non-symmetrizable. Now, we know from Example 1 that this does not
imply that every W ˝ U is non-symmetrizable as well. More precisely, to a given r P N there
may exist an alphabet Un, a p P PpUnq and a channel Un P CpU ,X nq such that
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Urq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Urq (217)
“ max
p1PPpUrq
max
U 1rPCpUr ,X r
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp1;Wq ˝ U 1rq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp1;Vsr ˝ U 1rq (218)
ě CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ´ ǫ (219)
but, additionally, pWsr ˝ UrqsrPSr is symmetrizable. We provide here two approaches to deal
with this problem: First, we will use the fact that W is non-symmetrizable for transmission of
a small number of messages that can be read by Eve but, since backwards communication from
Eve to James is forbidden, are sufficient to counter any of the allowed jamming strategies.
Second, we will consider a variant of the optimization problem (4) where optimization of U 1r is
restricted to maps of the form U 1r “ IdbU22,...,r and we will prove that these restricted maps are
asymptotically as good as those that are derived from the original problem when it comes to
calculating capacity. However, these maps have the additional property that they cannot turn
a non-symmetrizable AVC into a symmetrizable one.
Now let r P N be arbitrary but fixed and p, Ur as above. Let k, l P N be such that n “ k` l and
l “ tλ ¨ nu, where λ P p0, 1q is arbitrary but fixed for the moment. Then from [22, Lemma 5],
if Kˆ satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 2 with L set to one based on the properties (65), (66)
and (67) of the lemma.
So, on the grounds of 2 and of the results proven in [22], we see that for every m1 P N, r P N and
δ ą 0, p P Pm10 pUrq (where Ur “ r|X |rs ) and U P CpUr,X rq there exists a code K “ pKmq8m“1
such that for every sr¨m P pSrqm “ Sr¨m we have
1
K 1k
K 1kÿ
a“1
ÿ
xk
wskpD1a|x1aq ě 1´ ǫk, (220)
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where tǫkukPN Ă r0, 1s, limkÑ8 ǫk “ 0 and it may be assumed that K 1k “ l3. In addition to that
we know from [38] that there exist codes for pW,Vq such that
min
slPSl
1
Γl
1
K2l
Γl,K
2
lÿ
a,b“1
ÿ
xlPX l
ulpxl|a, bqwslpD2a,b|x2abq ě 1´ δl, (221)
where tδlulPN Ă r0, 1s, limlÑ8 ǫl “ 0, Γl “ l3, Ul P CprΓls ˆ rK2l s,X lq is stochastic pre-coding
and Da,b XDa,b1 “ H whenever b ‰ b1 (a P rΓls is used as common randomness in [38], whereas
here we will substitute the messages that were sent on the first k channel uses for it. Note that
the messages on the first k channel uses are not secure against Eve). In addition to that it holds
lim
lÑ8
1
l
logK2l “ CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ´ ν (222)
for some arbitrarily small ν ą 0 and
lim
lÑ8
1
l
max
γPrΓls
max
slPSl
IpK2l ;Zsl | l “ aq “ 0. (223)
The mutual information is evaluated on the random variables defined via
PslppK2l ,Zsl ,  lq “ pb, zl, aqq :“
1
Γl
1
K2l
ÿ
xlPX l
ulpxl|a, bqvpzl|sl, xlq. (224)
We concatenate the two codes by defining new stochastic encodings En P CprK2l s,X nq via
enppxk, xlq|bq :“
Γlÿ
a“1
δxapxkqulpxl|a, bq (225)
and new decoding sets via
Db :“ YaD1a ˆD2a,b Ă X n. (226)
It holds DbXDb1 “ Ya,a1pDaˆDa,bXDa1ˆDa1,b1q “ H. We set Kn :“ K2l , αn :“ ǫk and βn :“ δl
for the l satisfying l “ tλ ¨nu and the k satisfying k “ n´ l. Then limnÑ8 αn “ limnÑ8 βn “ 0.
As a consequence of the Innerproduct Lemma in [2] we know that for every sn “ psk, slq we have
1
Kn
Knÿ
b“1
ÿ
xnPXn
enpxn|bqwpDb|sn, xnq ě 1
Kl
Γk ,K
1
lÿ
a,b“1
ÿ
xlPXn
upxl|a, bqwpD1a|sk, xkqwpD2a,b|sl, xlq (227)
ě 1´ 2maxtαn, βnu. (228)
That the messages b P rKns are also asymptotically secure in the sense that
lim
nÑ8
1
n
max
snP∫n
IpKn;Zsnq ď lim
lÑ8
λ
l
max
slPSl
IpK2l ;Zsl | lq (229)
“ 0 (230)
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follows from independence of the distributions of the messages b and the values a of the common
randomness as described in the inequalities from (48) to (57). Especially inequality (48) is valid
since as a consequence of (223). The rate of the code is calculated as
lim
nÑ8
1
n
logKn “ λ
`
CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ´ ν
˘
. (231)
Since ν can be arbitrarily close to 0 and λ can be chosen arbitrarily close to 1 we have proven
the desired result.
We now explain the second approach to proving statement 2. in Theorem 2. Here we aim
to utilize the full power of Lemma 2 with Γ “ 1. Our starting point are the distributions p and
the channels U arising from the optimization (4) for fixed r P N. Note that, without loss of
generality, Ur “ X r for every r P N in (4). Set, for every r P N,
Cr :“ max
pPPpX rq
max
UrPCpX r ,X rq
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Urq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Urq. (232)
Let r P N be arbitrary but fixed. For an arbitrary ǫ ě 0, let p and Ur be such that
Cr ´ ǫ “ min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Urq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Urq. (233)
Now define U˜r`1 by u˜r`1ppx1, . . . , xr`1q|px, uqq :“
ř
x1PX urppx1, x2, . . . , xr`1q|uqδxpx1q for all
x, x1, . . . , xr`1 P X and u P Ur “ X r. Then it holds that
Cr`1 ě min
qPPpSr`1q
Ipp b π;Wq ˝ Ur`1q ´ max
sr`1PSr`1
Ipp b π;Vsr`1 ˝ Ur`1q (234)
ě min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Urq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Urq ´ log |X | (235)
“ Cr ´ ǫ´ log |X |, (236)
where π P PpX q is defined by πpxq :“ |X |´1 for all x P X . This latter estimate is due to
the equality Ipp b π;Vsr`1 ˝ Ur`1q “ Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq ` Ipπ;Vsr`1q, the data processing inequality
and the fact that for arbitrary channels S P CpA ˆ B, Cq and T P CpA1 ˆ B1, C1q, as well as
distributions q P SpB ˆ B1q with respective marginal distributions qB P PpBq and qB1 P PpB1q
and p P SpAˆA1q with respective marginal distributions pA P PpAq and qA1 P PpA1q we have
@ pa, b, cq P Aˆ B ˆ C :
ÿ
a1,c1
ÿ
b,b1
spc|a, bqtpc1|a1, b1qppa, a1qqpb, b1q “
ÿ
b
qBpAtpc|a, bq. (237)
Since W is non-symmetrizable we know that Wbr ˝ U˜r is non-symmetrizable for every r ě 2.
The reason for that is explained as follows: Let again S, T be channels as above. Assume that S
is symmetrizable but T is not. Then SbT is non-symmetrizable. This can be seen by assuming
the existence of a symmetrising map Q P CpAˆA1,B ˆ B1q. The statement
@pa1, a2, a11, a12q P A2 ˆA12 :ÿ
b,b1
sp¨|a1, bqtp¨|a11, b1qqpb, b1|a2, a12q “
ÿ
b,b1
sp¨|a2, bqtp¨|a12, b1qqpb, b1|a1, a11q (238)
would obviously imply for any fixed choice of pa1, a2q the statement
@pa11, a12q P AˆA1 :
ÿ
b1
tp¨|a11, b1qqB1pb1|a2, a12q “
ÿ
b1
tp¨|a12, b1qqB1pb1|a1, a11q, (239)
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where qB1pb1|a1, a11q :“
ř
b qpb, b1|a1, a11q. This would be in contradiction to non-symmetrizability
of T . Since U˜r “ Ur´1b Id we can thus conclude that Wbr ˝ U˜r is non-symmetrizable. We now
proceed with the proof of Theorem 2.
With this approach we have evaded the problem that Wbr ˝Ur may well be symmetrizable (see
our Example 1).
By [22, Lemma 4] non-symmetrizability ofWbr˝U˜r implies that it is possible to define a decoder
according to [22, Definition 3], with N “ K ¨ L and rN s replaced by rKs ˆ rLs. Since only the
number of codewords and their type ever enters the proof it makes no difference whether we
enumerate them by one index taken from rN s or by two indices taken from rKs ˆ rLs. This
decoder is proven to work reliably in [22, Lemma 5] (even with an exponentially fast decrease of
average error), if N “ K ¨L satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 2 based on the properties (65),
(66) and (67) of the lemma.
So, on the grounds of Lemma 2 and of the results proven in [22], we see that for every m P N,
r P Nzt1u and δ ą 0, p P Pm0 pX rq and U P CpX r´1,X r´1q there exists a code K “ pKmq8m“1
such that for every sr¨m P pSrqm “ Sr¨m we have
1
Km
1
Lm
Km,Lmÿ
k,l“1
ÿ
xm¨r
wsm¨rpDkl|xm¨rqubmpxm¨r|uklq ě 1´ ǫm, (240)
where tǫmumPN Ă r0, 1s, limmÑ8 ǫm “ 0 and it holds that
lim inf
mÑ8
1
m
logpKm ¨ Lmq ě min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wmq ˝ U˜rq ´ δ (241)
(the code we use here is defined by using the codewords xklγ together with the decoder from
[22, Definition 3] defined for the AVC Wbr ˝ U˜r :“ pWsr ˝ pUr´1 b IdqqsrPSr) and
max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ U˜rq ` 2δ ě lim inf
mÑ8
1
m
logLm ě max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ U˜rq ` δ, (242)
implying that for a sequence ppmqmPN of choices for pm converging to some p having a decom-
position p “ p1 b π for p1 P PpX r´1q being an optimal choice in the sense of (232) we get
lim inf
mÑ8
1
m
logKm ě min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ U˜rq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ U˜rq ´ 3δ (243)
ě Cr´1 ´ log |X | ´ 3δ. (244)
Also, it is clear from the last part of Lemma 2 (equation (68)) together with [38, Lemma 20]
that the codes employed here are asymptotically secure in the strong sense:
lim sup
mÑ8
max
sr¨m
IpKm;Zsr¨mq “ 0. (245)
We now wish to apply the code for the extended channel pWbr ˝ U˜r,Vbrq to the original channel
pW,Vq. Define values tn P t0, . . . , r ´ 1u by requiring n “ m ¨ r ` tn for them to hold for some
suitably chosen m “ mpnq P N. This quantity satisfies ´1`n{r ď mpnq ď n{r. For every n P N
we then define new decoding sets by
Dˆkl :“ Dkl ˆ Ytn (246)
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and new randomized encodings by setting for some arbitrary but fixed xtn
Epxˆn|kq :“
Lÿ
l“1
1
L
ubnpxm¨r|uklq ¨ δxtn pxˆtnq. (247)
From the choice of codewords and the decoding rule it is clear that this code is asymptoti-
cally reliable. The asymptotic number of codewords (mind that Kˆn “ Kmpnq) calculated and
normalized with respect to n, is
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
log Kˆn “ lim inf
nÑ8
1
mpnq ¨ r ` tnKmpnq (248)
ě lim inf
nÑ8
1
r
¨ 1
mpnq ` 1Kmpnq (249)
“ lim inf
nÑ8
1
r
¨ 1
mpnq ¨
mpnq
mpnq ` 1 ¨Kmpnq (250)
“ 1
r
lim inf
nÑ8
1
mpnq ¨Kmpnq (251)
“ 1
r
pCr´1 ´ 3δq (252)
“ 1
r ´ 1 ¨
r ´ 1
r
pCr´1 ´ log |X | ´ 3δq . (253)
In addition to that, the code is secure: For each n P N, the distribution of the input codewords
and Eve’s outputs is
PpKn “ k,Zsn “ znq
“
Lÿ
l“1
1
L
ÿ
xr¨m
ÿ
xtn
ubmpxr¨m|uklqvbr¨mpzr¨m|xr¨m, sr¨mqvbtnpztn |xtn , stnq (254)
“ PpKn “ k,Zsr¨m “ zr¨mq ¨ vbtnpztn |xtn , stnq. (255)
This demonstrates that (uniformly in sn P Sn and since Kn “ Km holds) we have
IpKn;Zsnq “ IpKn;Zsr¨mq ` 0 “ IpKm;Zsr¨mq. (256)
Since the right hand side of above equation goes to zero for n going to infinity and since
limrÑ8 r´1r “ 1 we see that the capacity CS is lower bounded by limrÑ8 1rCr. It is not an
immediate consequence that this implies we can reach the capacity CmeanS,ran pW,Vq “ C˚pW,Vq.
Fortunately it has been proven in [38] that
C˚pW,Vq “ lim
rÑ8
1
r
max
pPPpUnq
max
UnPCpU ,Xnq
ˆ
min
qPPpSrq
Ipp;Wq ˝ Uq ´ max
srPSr
Ipp;Vsr ˝ Uq
˙
(257)
holds. Thus limrÑ8 1rCr “ C˚pW,Vq. This finally implies the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 3. If CSpW,Vq “ 0, there is nothing to prove. Assume that CSpW,Vq ą 0.
It is evident that, in that case, W is not symmetrizable. The function F defined in Definition
12 is continuous with respect to the Hausdorff distance (proving this statement is in complete
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analogy as the corresponding part in the proof of Theorem 5 in [15]). Thus, if F pWq ą 0, then
there is an ǫ ą 0 such that for all W1 satisfying dpW,W1q ă ǫ we know that F pW1q ą 0 as well.
Thus, every of these W1 is non-symmetrizable.
For some suitably chosen ǫ1 ă ǫ we additionally know from Theorem 9 in [38] that
CmeanS,ran pW1,Vq ą 0 for all those W1 for which dpW,W1q ă ǫ1. But since Theorem 1 shows
that F pW1q ą 0 ñ CSpW1,Vq “ CmeanS,ran pW1,Vq this implies that
CSpW,Vq ą 0 @ W1 : dpW,W1q ă ǫ1. (258)
Since from Theorem 3 we know that positivity of CSpW1,Vq ensures that it equals CmeanS,ran pW1,Vq,
and since the latter is continuous, we are done.
Proof of Theorem 4. Again, we prove everything in the same order as it is listed in the theorem.
1. Let CS be discontinuous in the point pW,Vq. By Theorem 3 we know that this can
only be the case if CSpW,Vq “ 0. If in addition we have CmeanS,ran pW,Vq “ 0 then we have, since
CmeanS,ran is continuous, that for every ǫ ą 0 there is δ ą 0 such that for all pWδ,Vq satisfying
dpWδ ,Wq ă δ we have CmeanS,ran pWδ,Vq ď ǫ. Since since CmeanS,ran ě CS this would imply that CS is
continuous as well, in contradiction to the assumption. Thus CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ą 0. Of course this
immediately implies thatW has to be symmetrizable, by property 2. This is, in turn, equivalent
to F pWq “ 0. The definition of F can be picked up from equation (58), its connection to
symmetrizability is obvious from the definition. The notion of symmetrizability is explained in
the introduction in equation (3). Clearly, if for all ǫ ą 0 and W1 satisfying dpW,W1q ă ǫ we
would have F pW1q “ 0, then CSpW1,V1q would be zero in a whole vicinity of pW,Vq. Thus for
all ǫ ą 0 there has to be at least one Wǫ such that dpW,Wǫq ă ǫ but F pWǫq ą 0.
The reverse direction is basically established by using all our arguments backwards: For all
ǫ ą 0, let there be at least one Wǫ such that dpW,Wǫq ă ǫ but F pWǫq ą 0. Let in addition to
that F pWq “ 0 but CmeanS,ran pW,Vq ą 0. Since CmeanS,ran is continuous, there is a δ ą 0 such that
CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q ą p1{2q ¨ CmeanS,ran pW,Vq “: α whenever dppW,Vq, pW1,V1qq ă δ.
For every ǫ1 ď p1{2qmintǫ, δu we can therefore deduce the following: It holds that
CSpWǫ1 ,Vq “ CmeanS,ran pWeps1,Vq ě α ą 0 (since F pWǫ1q ą 0), but CSpW0,Vq “ 0. Thus
CS is discontinuous in the point pW,Vq.
2. Let CS be discontinuous in the point pW,Vq. By property 4 this implies that for all
ǫ ą 0 there is Wǫ such that dpW,Wǫq ă ǫ but F pWǫq ą 0. If Vˆ is such that CmeanS,ran pW, Vˆq ą 0
then the pair pW, Vˆq fulfills all the points in the second of the two equivalent formulations in
statement 4, and this implies that CS is discontinuous in the point pW, Vˆq.
4.7 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is in many ways similar to the one for Lemma 1. As we know
already that for some c1 ą 0 and all large enough n P N
PpE3 X E4 X E5q ě 1´ Γ ¨ expp2´n¨c1q (259)
holds from [22], there is not much left to prove, as only PpE1q needs to be controlled in order to
get statement p68q of Lemma 2. We know from Lemma 6 that both
PpEA1q ď 2 ¨ |X ˆ S ˆ Z|n ¨ expp´2n¨τ{2q, (260)
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if we choose δ “ δpτq. Keeping in mind that we already know from [22] that PpE3XE4XE5q ě
1´ Γ ¨ expp2n¨c1q we can combine all the previous to get the statement
PpE3 X . . .X E1q ě 1´ p2` Γq ¨ expp´2n¨c2q, (261)
for some c2 ą 0 and for all large enough n. If Γ scales at most exponentially there will thus exist
N0 P N such that for all n ě N0 there exists a choice x “ pxklγqK,L,Γk,l,γ“1 satisfying all conditions
in Lemma 2 and, in addition, the estimate
@ sn, zn, k : 1
L ¨ Γ
L,Γÿ
l,γ“1
Θsn,znpxklγq R rp1 ˘ 2´nτ{4qEΘsn,zns. (262)
That this leads to secure transmission is proven exactly as in the proof of Lemma 1. The Lemma
is thus proven.
4.8 Proof of Theorem 5 (super-activation results)
We will divide this proof into three parts, each corresponding to its counterpart in Theorem 5.
Proof. 1. Let us start with the “only if” statement. Clearly, if W1bW2 is symmetrizable then
CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q “ 0. So, this part of the statement is proven.
If, on the other hand, W1 bW2 is not symmetrizable and CmeanS,ran pW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą 0 then
on account of Theorem 2, statement 1, we know that CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą 0.
This proves the first part of the Theorem.
2. In [16], Section VI, an explicit example of a pair pWi,Viqi“1,2 has been given with
the property that W1 is symmetrizable, but W2 is not. By elementary calculus, this implies
that W1 bW2 is non-symmetrizable.
Since this holds, our Theorem 2, statement 1, shows that the uncorrelated capacity of
pW1 bW2,V1 bV2q equals its randomness-assisted capacity.
In [16] it was further shown that CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q ą 0 and CSpWi,Viq “ 0 (i “ 1, 2).
3. By assumption, CmeanS,ran pWi,Viq “ 0 (i “ 1, 2) but CmeanS,ran pW1 b V1,W2 b V2q ą 0.
The former implies CSpWi,Viq “ 0 (i “ 1, 2). If W1 and W2 were symmetrizable then clearly
W1 bW2 would be symmetrizable and by [27] the message transmission capacity of W1 bW2
would be zero, implying CSpW1bW2,V1 bV2q “ 0. If on the other hand either W1 or W2 are
not symmetrizable then W1 bW2 is not symmetrizable and this implies
CSpW1 bW2,V1 bV2q “ CmeanS,ran pW1 bW2,V1 bV2q ą 0, (263)
where the equality is due to Theorem 2, part 1, and the lower bound is true by assumption.
4. We do again rely on Theorem 2. Let both W1 and W2 be symmetrizable. Then
W1 bW2 is symmetrizable. Since by assumption CmeanS,ran shows no super-activation on the pair
pWi,Viq (i “ 1, 2) it follows that CS cannot show super-activation as well. Thus at least one of
the two AVCs has to be non-symmetrizable. Let without loss of generality this channel be W1.
If in addition W2 would be non-symmetrizable, then CSpWi,Viq “ CmeanS,ran pWi,Viq would hold
for i “ 1, 2 and since W1 bW2 would be symmetrizable as well, we would additionally have
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CSpW1bW2,V1bV2q “ CmeanS,ran pW1bW2,V1bV2q. But since CmeanS,ran shows no super-activation
on the pair pWi,Viq (i “ 1, 2) this cannot be. Thus again without loss of generality we have
W2 is symmetrizable.
Since we are talking about super-activation of CS, it has to be that CSpWi,Viq “ 0 holds for
i “ 1, 2. But since W1 is non-symmetrizable this requires that CmeanS,ran pW1,V1q “ 0 holds. If in
addition we would have CmeanS,ran pW2,V2q “ 0 would hold than CS could not be super-activated
since CmeanS,ran cannot be super-activated by assumption. Thus C
mean
S,ran pW2,V2q ą 0.
4.9 Proof of Lemma 3
We now prove Lemma 3: First and without loss of generality, we have A Ă A1. Let U be
symmetrizable. Let Q P CpA,Rq be the symmetrizing channel, meaning that for all a, a1 P A
the equality
pU ˝ pIdbQqq pa, a1q “ pU ˝ pIdbQqq pa1, aq (264)
holds true. It follows that for all a, a1 P A1 it holds that
pU ˝ pT bQT qq pa, a1q “
ÿ
a2,a3PA
ÿ
rPR
up¨|a2, rqtpa2|aqqpr|a3qtpa3|a1q (265)
“
ÿ
a2,a3PA
ÿ
rPR
up¨|a3, rqtpa2|aqqpr|a2qtpa3|a1q (266)
“ pU ˝ pT bQT qq pa1, aq. (267)
Thus, U1 is symmetrizable.
5 Appendix (auxiliary results and proofs)
Lemma 8 (Cf. [11]). Let p P PpX q. For every n ě |X |2, there is p1 P Pn0 pX q such that
}p´ p1}1 ď 2|X |
n
(268)
and ppxq “ 0 implies p1pxq “ 0 for all x P X .
Proof of Lemma 8. Let n P N be arbitrary. Set X 1 :“ tx P X : ppxq ą 0u. From the next lines
it will follow that, without loss of generality, we may assume X “ X 1. For sake of simplicity,
assume again without loss of generality that X “ t1, . . . , |X |u and that pp|X |q ě 1{|X |. Choose
p1piq, for i “ 1, . . . , |X |´1, such that |p1piq´ppiq| ď 1
n
. Clearly, this is possible. Then necessarily
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p1p|X |q “ 1´ř|X |´1i“1 p1piq and
}p´ p1}1 ď
|X |´1ÿ
i“1
1
n
` |p1p|X |q ´ pp|X |q| (269)
“ |X | ´ 1
n
` |
|X |´1ÿ
i“1
ppiq ´ p1piq| (270)
ď |X | ´ 1
n
`
|X |´1ÿ
i“1
|ppiq ´ p1piq| (271)
ď 2|X |
n
. (272)
Of course, while all the p1piq ě 0 by construction if i ă |X |, this does not hold for p1p|X |q. This
is where we need the additional condition that n ě |X |2:
p1p|X |q “ 1´
|X |´1ÿ
i“1
p1piq (273)
ě 1´
|X |´1ÿ
i“1
ppiq ´ |X | ´ 1
n
(274)
ě pp|X |q ´ |X |
n
(275)
ě 1|X | ´
|X |
n
(276)
ě 0. (277)
Lemma 9 (C.f. [19] ). Let aˆn P An and bˆn P Bn. There exists a function fC : N Ñ R` such
that with AˆBˆ being distributed as PppAˆ, Bˆq “ pa, bqq “ 1
n
Npa, b|aˆn, bˆnq we have
|tan : Np¨|aˆn, bˆnq “ Np¨|an, bˆnqu| “ 2n¨pHpAˆ|Bˆq´fCpnqq. (278)
The function fC satisfies limnÑ8 fCpnq “ 0.
The following Lemma is basically taken from [20]. It would generally be completely sufficient
for proving all our statements in sufficient generality.
Lemma 10. Let Dpp}qq ď δ. For the function f1 : r0, 1{2s Ñ R` defined by f1pxq :“
´ax{2 logpx|Z|2q we have that
|Hppq ´Hpqq| ď f4pδq. (279)
Clearly, limδÑ0 f4pδq “ 0.
Note that ppxq “ 0 implies p1px|sq “ 0 for all s P S, by construction.
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Proof. From Pinsker’s inequality we have }p ´ q}1 ď
?
2δ and, accordingly, by Lemma 2.7 in
[20], |Hppq ´Hpqq| ď ´?2δ logp?2δ{|Z|q.
We did however feel that it would be interesting to use a slightly more general version of
Lemma 10, which led us to prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 11 (Continuity of conditional entropy with respect to averaged norm). Let p P PpX q
and channels w, r : PpX q Ñ PpZq be given such thatÿ
xPX
ppxq}wp¨|xq ´ rp¨|xq}1 ď δ ď 1. (280)
Then
|Hpw|pq ´Hpr|pq| ď f1pδq, (281)
where f1pδq :“ |Z| ¨ hp δ|Z|q.
Proof of Lemma 11. As in [20], set νptq :“ ´t log t and observe that ν is concave and satisfies
νp0q “ νp1q “ 0. This brings with it the property that for all s, λ P r0, 1s we have
νpλ ¨ aq ě λ ¨ νpaq, νpλ ¨ a` 1´ λq ě λ ¨ νpaq. (282)
We wish to obtain a meaningful bound on |νpsq ´ νptq| in terms of |s ´ t|. To this end, assume
without loss of generality that s ď t. Observe that this implies that |t´ s| “ t´ s, so that both
νp|t´ s|q ` νpsq “ νpt ¨ t´ s
t
q ` νpt ¨ s
t
q (283)
ě t´ s
t
¨ νptq ` s
t
¨ νptq (284)
“ νptq (285)
and with λ :“ t´s
1´s satisfying 0 ď λ ď 1 we have
νp1´ |t´ s|q ` νptq “ νpλ ¨ s` 1´ λq ` νpλ` p1´ λq ¨ sq (286)
ě λνpsq ` p1´ λqνpsq (287)
“ νpsq, (288)
so that in total we get for every two number s, t P r0, 1s:
|νptq ´ νpsq| ď maxtνp|t´ s|q, νp1´ |t´ s|qu (289)
ď νp|t´ s|q ` νp1´ |t´ s|q (290)
“ hp|t´ s|q (291)
where h denotes the binary entropy. Then for every pǫxqxPX P r´1, 1s|X | and ptxqxPX P r0, 1s|X |
such that tx ` ǫx P r0, 1s for all x P X we get:
|
ÿ
xPX
ppxqpνptxq ´ νptx ` ǫxqq| ď
ÿ
xPX
ppxq|νptxq ´ νptx ` ǫxq| (292)
ď
ÿ
xPX
ppxqhp|ǫx|q (293)
ď hp
ÿ
xPX
ppxq|ǫx|q. (294)
49
Then, we write txz :“ wpz|xq and ǫxz :“ ´wpz|xq`rpz|xq. This leads to the bound we ultimately
need:
|
ÿ
xPX
ppxqHpwp¨|xqq ´Hprp¨|xqq| “ |
ÿ
zPZ
ÿ
xPX
ppxqpνpwpz|xqq ´ νprpz|xqqq| (295)
ď
ÿ
zPZ
|
ÿ
xPX
ppxqpνptxz ´ νptxz ` ǫxzq| (296)
ď
ÿ
zPZ
hp
ÿ
xPX
ppxq|ǫxz|q (297)
ď |Z| ¨ hp 1|Z|
ÿ
xPX
ÿ
zPZ
ppxq|ǫxz|q (298)
“ |Z| ¨ hp 1|Z|δq (299)
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